The Tigris and Euphrates BasinsThe Euphrates River originates in the mountains of East Turkey, where two tributaries rise before merging near Keban/Elazig to form the Euphrates River itself. After Keban, the river flows south, crossing into Syria at Jarablus. Within Syria, it is joined by the Sajur and Balikh rivers before entering Iraq at Al’Qa’em. It finally joins the Tigris in the south of Iraq to form the Shatt Al-Arab River, which drains into the Persian Gulf near Al-Faw.
The length of the Euphrates is around at 2,940 kilometres (km), with 40% in Turkey, 20.5% in Syria and 39.5% in Iraq. Although more than two thirds of the drainage area lies outside Turkey, 92% of the water in the river originates in Turkey. The drainage area of the Euphrates is widely accepted as 444,000 square kilometres (km2). The share of each state in the basin is like this: Turkish share at 28%, with Syria at 17%, Iraq 40% and Saudi Arabia 15%. The annual mean flow rate of the Euphrate at the Turkish-Syrian border is around 32 billion m3.
Like the Euphrates, the Tigris (1,840 km) also flows through Turkey, Syria and Iraq. In the Turkish Republic, the Tigris flows through the southeast for about 400 km where the main tributories Batman, Garzan and Botan join it, then forms the border with Syria for 40 km, and flows downstream to Iraq. In Iraq the Tigris is fed by the Great Zab, the Little Zab, the ‛Adhaim, and the Diyala rivers. Iraq’s share of the basin is at 45%,
Turkey’s share at 25%, Syria’s at 2% and Iran’s share at 28%. The river’s flow is characterized by a high annual and seasonal variability. The annual mean flow is 520 m3/s at the border between Turkey and Syria (17 billion m3). The lowest flow was 9.6 billion m3 in 1973, and the highest was 34.3 billion m3 in 1969. Mean flow in April is 1433 m3/s, while the driest month is September with 113 m3/s. Downstream, at Baghdad, the average flow is 1236 m3/s.1 Although Turkey shares only around 25% of the basin area, together with the Great Zap River, which originates in the province Hakkari within the Turkish borders, 55% of whole Tigris mean annual flow comes from Turkey.
Dam Constructions and Conflict on the Tigris and Euphrates before the GAPIn the case of the Tigris and Euphrates basins, the role that dams have played in exacerbating conflict between the major riparian States - Turkey, Syria and Iraq - is clear.
All three countries rely on the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris for their agriculture, energy and future development. Unsurprisingly, the development of engineering projects on the two rivers, notably large dams and irrigation works, has been a source of growing tension between the riparian states.
Although outright violence has been avoided, hostilities have mounted each time that a new dam has been built or proposed. On at least three occasions, water related hostilities have brought the various parties to the brink of war, with troops being mobilised and threats made to bomb existing dams.
Iraq, the last downstream state on the rivers, was the first to develop dams on the Euphrates, constructing the Hindiya Dam on the Euphrates in 1914 and a second Dam at ar-Ramadi in the 1950s.
Although both Turkey and Syria began feasibility studies for developing the two rivers in the mid-1950s, neither country undertook construction of any major works until 1966 when Syria started the Tabqa High Dam, later renamed al-Thawrah ("The Revolution"), on the Euphrates and Turkey began construction of the Keban Dam, also on the Euphrates.
Both dams triggered major international disputes. The start of construction on the Keban Dam prompted protests from Syria to Turkey, whilst the completion of the Tabqua Dam led Iraq to threaten military action in 1974 and again in 1975,4 with both Syria and Iraq mobilising their troops and moving them to the border.
Mediation by the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia diffused the crisis after Syria agreed to release more water from the dam. Subsequently an agreement was reached between Syria and Iraq whereby Iraq receives 58% of the Euphrates water crossing the Syrian Turkey border. The agreement has greatly eased tension between the two countries, leading to what Syrian government sources describe as "an era of cooperation between the two countries over water".
The GAP – Southeastern Anatolia ProjectRelations between Syria and Iraq on the one hand, and Turkey on the other, have however remained tense, with both Syria and Iraq expressing grave concerns over Turkey's ambitious Southeast Anatolia Project, known as GAP, after its Turkish name "Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi". Under the GAP, the Turkish government plans to develop a cluster of 14 dams on the Euphrates basin and 8 on the Tigris.
Launched in 19776 and covering nine mainly
Kurdish populated provinces with a total area of 74,000 square kilometres, the $32 billion project is the largest development project ever undertaken in Turkey, and one of the largest of its kind in the world.
Together with other planned projects, a total of at least 90 dams and 60 power plants8 will have been built on the two river basins, regulating 28 per cent of Turkey’s total water potential. In addition to generating 27 billion kilowatt hours (7467 MW capacity) of electricity, the dams would be used to irrigate 1.82 million hectares of land in order to grow cash crops and encourage the growth of agro-industries, such as food processing for export.
The newly irrigated land would increase the area in Turkey under irrigation by 40 per cent. Around the Ataturk dam, the region has been transformed into one of the most important centres of cotton production in Turkey. Overall, it is claimed that the GAP will generate 3.8 million jobs and raise per capita income in the region by 209 per cent.
Numerous government departments are involved in the implementation of GAP, under the aegis of the Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration (GAPRDA).
To date, Turkey has invested some $20 billion12 from its own domestic resources in GAP, with international institutions and the private sector investing a further $3.5 billion.
Of the planned water projects, 14 dams and 9 hydroelectric power plants have already been built - including the giant Ataturk, Karakaya, Keban, Birecik, Karkamis, Batman and Kralkizi dams. 74 percent of the planned hydroelectric plants are running, generating 51 percent of whole Turkey’s hydroenergy and approximately 15 per cent of Turkey’s total electricity production. As of 2009, 15 per cent of the total planned irrigation target had been achieved, with 8 to 10 per cent under construction.
Although originally conceived solely as a water development project, the GAP has now been expanded to include other infrastructure programmes, including the building of industrial areas, schools, health care centres, roads, housing and tourism centres. According to the GAP authorities, the integration of these projects into the GAP programme reflects Turkey's commitment to "sustainable human development that is in conformity with the Rio principles".
In reality, however, the GAP typifies "top down" development. There has been little or no consultation with affected communities and the projects are implemented without any local participation. Hundreds of thousand people have now been displaced, often forcibly and rarely with adequate compensation. Many have ended up in the shantytowns of the major cities, unable to find full-time employment and living in poverty.
The GAP has also caused major environmental degradation. Salinisation of irrigated land and soil erosion are now serious problems. Salinisation and high groundwater table occure already in 55% of the irrigated land in the plain of Harran (province Urfa), the main irrigation area.
The created dam reservoirs have
destroyed rich habitat for numerous plants and animals and they have big problems with the water quality which is a threat to flora and fauna species and also to the health of the population.
Today 95% of diseases can be determined in the region around the dam reservoirs on the Euphrates River.Further the dam reservoirs have flooded in that area, which is also known as Upper Mesopotamia, very important cultural heritage – thousands of archeological sites – along the rivers which have a history of up to 12.000 years. The most known of the submerged archeological sites are Samsat, Nevala Çori, Zeugma/Belkis, Hallan Çemi.
Concern has also been expressed over the political motivations underlying GAP. There is little doubt that the majority of GAP officials and field workers are deeply committed to the programme’s overt aims of poverty alleviation and economic development, or that the majority of people in the region, which is one of the poorest in Turkey, seek means to improve their living standards and to gain access to modern technologies, health care and education.
Yet the project has from its inception been underpinned by the Turkish State’s longpursued policy of assimilating the region’s Kurdish majority into mainstream Turkish society and culture. Indeed, the Turkish government’s official publicity for the project explicitly states that the GAP is intended to “
dramatically change the social and cultural make-up of the region.” So, it is widely held in many quarters that the Turkish authorities have promoted the GAP project as a means of altering the demography of the region, through the displacement of Kurds into larger towns so as to exercise more effective control over the region.
Dam Constructions and Conflict on the Tigris and Euphrates together with GAPSince the 80ies Turkey and Iraq have started to implement ambitious water development schemes on both the Tigris and the Euphrates, transforming the river and the lives of people who depend on it.
Iraq completed the large multi-purpose Mossul Dam with a reservoir capacity of 10 billion m3 in the late 1980s, and has started to construct the other big Samara dam on the Tigris with a similar storage capacity.
The Mosul Dam, combined with massive drainage works constructed after the Gulf War, has resulted in the transformation of the lower Tigris River and the destruction of main parts of the unique Mesopotamian Marshland ecosystem which has been followed by forced displacement of the indigenous Marsh Arabs. Meanwhile an important part of the destructed Marshlands could be restored after 2003.
Turkey's aggressive water politics were illustrated dramatically in 1990, when Turkey blocked the flow of the Euphrates for 9 days whilst filling the reservoir of the Atatűrk Dam, the biggest dam on the Euphrates.
Both Syria and Iraq accused Turkey of failing to inform them of the cut-off, prompting Iraq to threaten to bomb all the Euphrates dams. Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs rebutted such claims, arguing that its co-riparians had "been informed in a timely way that river flow would be interrupted for a period of one month, due to technical necessity", and that, prior to impoundment, more water than usual was released downstream, in order to allow Syria and Iraq to store sufficient waters to carry them through the impoundment period.
Turkey also argued that the average flow downstream never fell below 500 million cubic metres per second (m3/s) - the minimum agreed under a 1987 Protocol signed between Turkey and Syria.16 This is disputed by both Syria and Iraq, which point out that the decision to release “extra” water downstream prior to impoundment was taken unilaterally by Turkey and without sufficient notice.
Syria also notes that whilst the average monthly discharge at Jarablus on the Turkish-Syrian border for the year 1989-90 may not have fallen below far the agreed 500 m3/s, the monthly discharge in January and February 1990 was far lower – 321 m3/sec and 320 m3/sec respectively.
Further protests by Syria and Iraq were lodged with Turkey in 1993, prior to the construction of the Birecik Dam on the Euphrates. The same year, with many GAP dams at a low level due to drought, Turkey “chose to turn off the tap during the Muslim Feast of the Sacrifice in June, reducing the flow from 500 cubic metres per second to 170”18 in contravention of its agreement under the 1987 Protocol with Syria.
In Fall 1998 Turkey threatened Syria with war if Syria will not banish Abdulla Öcalan, the leader of PKK. Besides the threat with war Turkey blackmailed Syria with the cutting of Euphrates water. At the same time was a NATO military manoeuvre which was also an indirect signal to Syria. In the end Syria stepped back and Öcalan left Syria which ended up in its kidnapping to Turkey in February 1999.
In 2001 Turkey announced unilaterally that it was going to reduce the flow of the Euphrates to Syria to one third of the previously agreed amount because of severe drought in the region.
Concerns over GAPTurkey argues that the GAP is key to its future economic development. Although both Syria and Iraq are at pains to point out that they respect Turkey's right to develop, both countries fear that the GAP will result in serious downstream impacts, including dramatically reduced flow and increased levels of pollution. Both countries also fear that Turkey is using the GAP to establish control over the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates as part of a wider policy of establishing regional hegemony.
Link to Full Extremely Interesting Article:https://ercanayboga.blogspot.com/2009/0 ... tolia.html