Kurdistan Oil & Gas Development

[Anthea]

Kurdish MP: Baghdad’s position is wrong toward oil export from Kurdistan

Baghdad: MP for Kurdistan Alliance and the decision maker of the parliamentary oil and energy Commission, Qassim Mohammed said on Monday, that the threat of Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri al-Maliki to deduct 17 percent allocated to Kurdistan Region from the general budget is a " wrong position.

" Maliki on Tuesday threatened to deduct 17 percent allocated to Kurdistan Region from the general budget of Iraq if the Kurds went in their plans to export oil to Turkey. Mohammed said that "It seems that Baghdad government is annoyed by the export of oil from the region and this position is wrong and weakened the negotiating power of the regional government with foreign companies."

He added that "there is ambiguity and confusion by the federal government to export Kurdistan oil especially now that oil revenues are back to the federal treasury," adding that “the continuation of communication and negotiation between Erbil and Baghdad is enough to remove this ambiguity...shafaaq.com

[Anthea]

Kurdistan government, Iraqi government fail to agree on oil income

Baghdad: Iraq's Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Iraqi government reportedly failed to reach a consensus over the annual budget allocated to KRG and income of oil exported to Turkey during a meeting on Sunday.

The meeting was held at Iraqi prime ministry office that was attended by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Deputy PM for Energy Affairs Husain Shahristani and deputies of Kurdistan List of Iraqi Parliament. A deputy from Iraqi parliament, Ala Talabani, told Anadolu Agency that Maliki met with the Kurdish delegation to discuss various disagreements, notably budget issue, between the federal and local government.

The primary item of the meeting was energy and the Iraqi prime minister reached a consensus over many issues except one which was related to KRG's exporting of oil to Turkey on its own initiative, said the deputy, adding "If the regional government exports oil on its own initiative and does not transfer its income to Baghdad, KRG's 17 percent share in budget will be imperiled."

Noting the Baghdad government had serious concerns over KRG's exporting oil without its approval, Talabani also added the inter-delegational meeting that would be held on Tuesday was postponed indefinitely. worldbulletin.net | Ekurd.net's corrections.

[Anthea]

Iraq will seek legal redress and take other measures to punish Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan, as well as foreign companies, for any involvement in Kurdish exports of "smuggled" oil without Baghdad's consent, Iraq's oil minister said on Friday.

Abdul Kareem Luaibi told reporters the government was preparing legal action against Ankara and would blacklist any companies dealing with oil piped to Turkey from Iraq's autonomous northern region without permission from Baghdad.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) said last week that crude had begun to flow through the pipeline, and exports were on track to start at the end of January.

It invited bidders to register with the Kurdistan Oil Marketing Organisation.

The KRG's Ministry of Natural Resources and a spokesman for the KRG did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

Officials at Turkey's Foreign Ministry and Oil Ministry were not available for immediate comment.

Luaibi said it was not in Turkey's interest to jeopardise bilateral trade worth $12 billion (7.2 billion pounds) a year, saying Baghdad would consider boycotting all Turkish companies and cancelling all contracts with Turkish firms if the oil exports went ahead.

"Turkey must consider its commercial ties and its interests in Iraq," he said. "Turkey should know this issue is dangerous. It touches the independence and unity of Iraq.

"If Turkey allows the export of oil from the region, it is meddling in the division of Iraq, and this is a red line."

Baghdad has already blacklisted some companies for signing contracts with the KRG and last year threatened to sue Anglo-Turkish energy company Genel (GENL.L), the first firm to export oil directly from Kurdistan. That threat has not yet materialised.

Luaibi said the Finance Ministry had been told to calculate how much should be deducted from Iraqi Kurdistan's 17 percent share of the federal budget if the region failed to meet a government-set target for authorised crude exports via Iraq's State Oil Marketing Organisation this year of 400,000 barrels per day.

'CLEAR VIOLATION'

This target is well beyond Kurdistan's current export capacity of around 255,000 bpd. Kurdish ministers walked out of a federal cabinet session on Wednesday in protest at the draft state 2014 budget, which contains the target.

Industry sources do not expect Kurdistan's oil exports to reach 400,000 bpd until the end of this year or early 2015.

Luaibi said preparations are under way to sue the Turkish government for allowing Kurdistan to pump oil through the export pipeline without the approval of Baghdad.

He called this "a clear violation of the agreement signed between the two countries ... governing the export of Iraqi oil through Turkey."

"All companies...were notified not to deal with the (Kurdish) region to buy any quantity of oil which is considered as smuggled," he said. Any firms which did so risked legal action and an Iraqi government boycott.

"The Ministry of Oil will never deal with them at all," he said.

Luaibi reiterated Baghdad's stance that it has sole rights to manage energy resources, saying this was vital to Iraq's stability and that any breach would have "dire ramifications".

Kurdish Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani had been due to visit Baghdad for talks on the dispute, rooted in disagreement over how to exploit Iraq's vast oil resources and share the proceeds. It was not clear whether his visit would go ahead.

Kurdistan used to export crude to Turkey through a pipeline controlled by Baghdad, but stopped the flow a year ago after the central government withheld payments to oil companies operating in the northern enclave. Baghdad said it would not pay as the KRG had not met its previous export target of 250,000 bpd.

Since then, the Kurds have been trucking smaller quantities of crude to Turkey and collecting the revenues directly, while laying their own pipeline, which was completed late last year.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki said that Kurdistan's missed export targets had cost Iraq $9 billion in lost revenue in recent years.

http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/01/1 ... WA20140117

[Anthea]

As Kurdistan Battles Baghdad Over Oil Deal, Where is Kurdish Voice in Washington?

With the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) locked in one of the most important battles of its existence with Baghdad -- over the right to independent oil exports -- a nagging question looms: Who is lobbying on behalf of the Kurds where it counts most, in Washington.

The answer is: No one.

The seat of the KRG representative in the United States has remained cold for more than a year, without any official explanation. Political insiders blame the vacancy on an age-old rivalry between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).

Without a person with credibility, charisma and cash to grease-the-hands-that-change-the- minds in Washington, the Kurds have shot themselves in the foot in their row with Baghdad. Instead of leaping into the diplomatic battleground, they are limping in. Instead of a Kurdish public relations blitzkrieg in Washington, there is a deafening silence.

No Iraqi Kurd needs to learn why it matters to have American support in any battle with Baghdad, or with anyone else. Who doesn’t know that, without American backing for Kurdish autonomy in 1991, today the Kurdistan Region might not have been? Without that, this very winter hordes of shivering Kurds might once again have been huddled behind the borders of neighboring countries, pleading to get in.

Instead, from Erbil the Kurds control and patrol their own borders today. Again this winter, they opened their doors to fellow Kurds from Syria, and were thanked by the UN. In Erbil on Tuesday, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon expressed his gratitude to the KRG for its “generosity” toward tens of thousands of Syrian refugees.

Now, the Kurds need America again, this time in a war to control and sell their own oil and gas. Kurdish prosperity and security both depend on this deal. Kurdistan’s future depends on it.

It is not an exaggeration to say that a successful oil deal would put Iraqi Kurds on the road to independence. To an extent, it would give them self-sufficiency, and the choice to stay or leave the federation. That is why Baghdad is fighting tooth and claw to block this deal. It is not easy for Baghdad to let loose the goose that lays the golden eggs.

In its opposition, Baghdad has Uncle Sam on its side, shaking an admonishing finger at the Kurds. Baghdad has an able ambassador in Washington, while the Kurds have no one.

It is no secret that nothing gets done in Washington without the big lobbies; and that almost anything can be done by throwing enough cash into it.

Also, it is no secret that members of the US Congress and Senate often need all the help they can get to understand the world beyond America’s big borders. It is doubtful that most members of the US Congress and Senate even know what the KRG is. Who is there to help them find Kurdistan on the map?

How important is lobbying in Washington?

Ask The American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) why it spends tens of millions of dollars every year. Ever wonder why Uncle Sam has such a blind spot for Israel?

Ask the mining, defense and oil industries why they run the largest lobbies on The Hill. When was the last time the US Congress or Senate voted against these industries?

There is a name for how Washington functions: It’s called “Buying Influence.” This is the business of paying to change minds. Call it what you will, but that’s how it works.

How important is it to be heard in Washington?

Ask the Arabs why they have their own lobby.

Or even ask Baghdad why it chose Lukman Faily as its ambassador.

The Iraqi Embassy website boasts his credentials to include, “a familiarity with Anglo-American traditions and institutions.” The UK-educated diplomat holds degrees in computer science and mathematics, an MBA and a post-graduate degree. He worked for 10 years in senior positions with a company that is now part of IT giant Hewlett Packard. He was also ambassador to Japan. And, he speaks Kurdish.

Was it not the successful public relations and media campaigns that Kurdish groups and leaders ran in Europe and the United States in the 1990s that garnered world support for the Kurds, during their last wars with Saddam Hussein.

Without that, would Western countries have opened doors to so many Kurdish refugees, at a time when Kurds fleeing from Saddam had to choose between Iraq and a hard place?

Ever wonder why the United States did not lift a finger after Saddam’s 1988 gassing of 5,000 innocent Kurds in Halabja? An important part of the reason was that the Kurds had no one speaking on their behalf in Washington.

“There was nobody standing up for them, almost nobody,” recalled Peter Galbraith, a former US diplomat and ex-advisor to the KRG, in a 2007 published article.

Of course, it was US foreign policy then to support Saddam against Iran. Without any Kurds screaming on Capitol Hill about Saddam’s murderous machinery, without anyone going on CNN, it was easy for the US administration to ignore what it did not want to see.

If the KRG really does have a legitimate right to independent oil exports, who is making that case before American policy makers? Who is explaining it on CNN or to the Washington Post?

The present fight over oil is not the only one for which the Kurds need the Americans on their side.

The issue of Kurdish independence -- the elephant in the room that no one in the KRG wants to talk about -- will eventually have to be resolved. It does not take a crystal ball to predict that Iraq will be trapped in violence, bloodshed and instability for a long time. Even if it does not want to secede, a stable and prosperous KRG can remain chained to a crumbling federation only for so long.

Kurdish independence and independent Kurdish energy exports both remain anathema to American policy. That is all the more reason to have someone in Washington working full time, all the time, passionately promoting the Kurdish cause, whenever and wherever it counts.

Until he was pulled out and returned to a senior government post in Kurdistan about a year-and-half ago, representing the KRG in Washington was the job of Qubad Talabani, the son of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani.

By all accounts Qubad, who was raised and educated in the United Kingdom, was an able operator and articulate voice of the Kurds, someone who began learning the ropes in Washington in 2000.

A year after he officially became the KRG representative in 2006, an article in USA Today wrote that, in Washington, “The Kurds are the most aggressive of the Iraqi religious and ethnic factions jockeying for influence over US policy.”

It noted: “The Kurds have spent nearly $3 million on lobbying and public relations efforts here since 2003, including paying powerhouse Republican lobbying firm Barbour Griffith & Rogers nearly $1.7 million, according to Justice Department records.”

It reported that: “Barbour Griffith lobbyists met with Bush administration officials on the Kurds' behalf a dozen times between December 2005 and November 2006. They met with Ross Wilson, the U.S. ambassador to Turkey, and President Bush's deputy national security adviser for Iraq, Meghan O'Sullivan. Among other issues, the Kurds want U.S. support for their continued semi-autonomous status and their drive to make the oil-rich city of Kirkuk part of their territory.”

That was then.

In Washington, this is the Kurdish voice today:__________?

Once, on the battlefronts, the cost of the KDP-PUK power struggle was measured in lives.

Today, it is measured in countless other ways.

http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/18012014

[Anthea]

Barzani from Venice "There are ongoing discussions between The KRG and Baghdad over the oil exports"

Massoud Barzani, the President of Kurdistan Region, announced that the KRG and Baghdad are in ongoing discussions over the oil export issues. The Iraqi Ministry of Oil threatens that they are going to stand against the KRG and Turkey according to the Iraqi constitutions and through the courts.

Barzani is in Europe in an official visit. In a joint press conference with the President of the Republic of Venice, Barzani stated that the oil export issue between the KRG and the Federal government are on hot discussions over the oil exports from Kurdistan.
“I hope that they soon reach to an agreement to solve the issue” Barzani added.

Barzani stated that the KRG is using the Iraqi constitution in accordance to the Iraqi oil and energy laws on exporting Oil nothing beyond the constitution, and we will not compromise over our constitutional rights.

On the other hand, Abdulkarim Luaibi, the Iraqi Oil Minister, threatens the KRG, Turkey and those foreign oil companies that work with the KRG in exporting the oil without going back to Bagdad’s official permission.

“The oil companies which work on those pipeline projects that export the oil from the KRG to Turkey will be in ‘black list’ if they continue.” the Minister added.
In a response to the Iraqi Oil Minister, Abdul Karim Luaibi, Tanner Yildiz, the Turkish Minister of Energy said “we heard different statements every week from the Iraqi officials over the oil exports. Last week, the Iraqi government announced that they will export 400 thousand barrels to Turkey, and this week, they reversed the whole statement”

“We always state that if Turkey’s benefit is 1$, the Iraqis will be 100$” Tanner added
Tanner also confirmed that tomorrow, 19th of January, 2014, Erbil-Baghdad-Ankara committee will hold a meeting on the KRG oil exports to Turkey to find a solution that all are agree on”

http://www.pukmedia.com/EN/EN_Direje.aspx?Jimare=18182

[Anthea]

Kurdish Talks in Baghdad Over Oil, Budget End Inconclusively

ERBIL, Kurdistan Region – Meetings led by Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani in Baghdad to resolve rows over Erbil’s oil exports and budget ended inconclusively, with a decision to continue the talks at a later date.

Barzani called for the next meeting to be held in Erbil.

The Kurdish delegation held two meetings with an Iraqi team led by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, Deputy Prime Minister for Energy Affairs Hussein Shahristani and Iraqi Oil Minister Abdulkarim al-Lueibi. The Kurdish side also met separately with the two ministers, without Maliki.

The KRG visit comes just days after al-Lueibi threatened to take legal action against the KRG and Turkey over Kurdish oil exports, calling it "smuggled" oil. He warned Ankara over what he said was its interference in Iraqi internal affairs.

KRG spokesman Safeen Dizaye told Rudaw before the talks that, "The main goal of the visit is to find a solution for the pending budget and oil issues between the two sides."

Sources told Rudaw that the KRG has put forward two proposals to resolve the oil and budget issues.

The first is for the KRG to deduct the money from oil exports pertaining to its 17 percent of the budget, the payment for the Peshmarga and unpaid dues by Baghdad for foreign oil companies operating in Kurdistan.

The second option, in case there is a failure to agree to the previous one, is for the oil revenues to be placed in Turkey’s Halk Bank, and for the KRG to draw the money to compensate Kurds who suffered under successive Iraqi regimes.

Iraq's acting finance minister Fazil Nabi, a Kurd, explained that despite the row the KRG’s share of the budget continues to flow to the Kurdish enclave.

"Despite the ongoing issues between KRG and Baghdad, we continue to send the budget to Kurdistan. We even sent the share of the budget for January 2014 to Erbil," he said.

Nabil accused Shahristani of being antagonistic toward the Kurdish region and asking for its budget to be cut.

"It’s quite clear that Shahristani is against the Kurdistan Region and he constantly accuses me of sending Kurdistan’s share of the budget without caring about his directives to cut the KRG’s budget,” he said.

"We have always said that we don't depend on Shahristani’s directives when it comes to sending money to Kurdistan," he told Rudaw.

http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/190120141

[Anthea]

Abu Dhabi's TAQA to invest $1.2bn in Iraqi Kurdistan oil field

ABU DHABI,— Abu Dhabi National Energy Company (Taqa) plans to invest about $1.2 billion developing the Atrush oil and gas block in the autonomous Kurdistan region, the head of Taqa's Iraq operations said on Monday.

Taqa, which is majority owned by the government of Abu Dhabi, won approval from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to develop the block in late 2013.

It expects to invest more than $300 million in the first phase of the project, with first oil from the 30,000 barrel per day (bpd) first phase expected in early 2015.

Subject to KRG approval and further field appraisals, a second phase could add 30,000 bpd of oil production, along with some associated gas for the domestic market.

"Iraq is very much core to Taqa," Leo Koot told Reuters in an interview on the sidelines of a conference in Abu Dhabi.

"The investment in the next three phases will be similar to the first phase and production should be around 100,000 to 120,000 bpd of oil in four years," he said.

Deals between foreign investors and the KRG to develop oilfields have angered the federal government in Baghdad, which rejects them as illegal.

Abu Dhabi's former state utility is expanding a power plant in Kurdistan, which should be completed in mid-2015,www.Ekurd.net but it also hopes to build gas-fired power plants in southern Iraq to help Baghdad to overcome power shortages.

"We've had good discussions with the Iraqi government," Koot said, declining to go into details about the plant talks. (Editing by David Goodman)

Copyright ©, respective author or news agency, Reuters

http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/mi ... est935.htm

[Anthea]

KRG Oil Revenues Cannot Replace Iraqi Budget, Expert Says


Kurdish officials consistently complain that Baghdad has never allotted more than 10 percent of the budget to the Kurdistan Region, whereas Erbil is constitutionally entitled to 17 percent.

Even in the best of circumstances, the Kurdistan Region’s total revenues from oil exports would be less than half of its entitled share of the Iraqi budget, an energy expert said.

Responding to a statement by Iraqi deputy prime minister for energy, Hussein Shahristani, who said that Erbil could keep revenues from its controversial oil exports in lieu of what it receives from the national budget, Dr. Qaiwan Siwaili said the two figures were wildly unequal.

“We have reached the conclusion that even if several assumptions were true… instead of receiving the $14.6 billion the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is entitled to from the budget, it would only receive $8.398 billion from annual oil revenues,” he said.

“In fact, the real amount will be much less than this,” he added, citing many costs and variables that have not been included in his calculations.

Kurdish officials consistently complain that Baghdad has never allotted more than 10 percent of the budget to the Kurdistan Region, whereas Erbil is constitutionally entitled to 17 percent.

“The real question is whether the KRG can survive with such a budget, considering factors such as the huge administration costs, considerable number of government employees, corruption, lack of governing experience and hundreds of other economic difficulties,” Siwaili said.

His calculations were based on analyzing a best-case but unlikely scenario, under which oil prices remain at $100 per barrel for the entire year, exports remain uninterrupted at 400,000 barrels per day (bpd) and there are no additional costs such as transit or other fees.

Baghdad has strongly opposed independent oil exports by Erbil, bound for markets in Turkey and beyond. Baghdad and the Kurds are currently at loggerheads over how the revenues would be shared. In its anger, one of Baghdad’s suggestions has been that Erbil can keep the revenues, as long as it does not insist on its share of the national budget.

“Assuming that the exported oil through Turkey will be sold at the price of the international market is a weak premise as well, because according to the agreement between the Kurdistan Region and Turkey, 50 percent of the exported oil will be sold to Turkey at a lower price than on the international market, and only the other half will be sold at the price on the international market,” Siwaili explained.

Other assumptions are that the process of collecting oil revenues would be completely transparent and honest.

Siwaili also offered a reminder that the KRG is bound by revenue sharing agreements with foreign oil companies extracting the oil, meaning that the cash finally ending up in Erbil’s coffers would be even smaller than his calculations.

The KRG intends to boost current oil exports of 150,000 bpd to 400,000 bpd by the end of 2014.

http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/230120142

[Anthea]

Clash or compromise near on Iraqi-Kurdish-Turkish oil dispute

A headlong collision across Middle East fault lines is drawing close as Turkey, Iraq and ethnic Kurds who run their own region in between wrangle over oil exports.

Time is running out as more oil flows through a new pipeline from Iraqi Kurdistan for export from Turkey, in defiance of Baghdad, which has threatened to punish both Ankara and Arbil for "smuggling" oil out of Iraq.

Talks have borne little fruit and, with the Kurds seeking buyers for the oil from their autonomous territory thanks to an agreement with Turkey signed in November, Ankara will soon be forced to take sides.

"Turkey must now choose either to turn its back on Baghdad and go ahead with its deal with the Kurds, or suspend direct exports from the region until an agreement is reached between the central government and Arbil," said a senior Iraqi official who asked not to be named.

"Unfortunately, facts on the ground show that Ankara eventually will go ahead with their deals with the Kurds at the expense of their relations with Baghdad."

Oil traders expect at least one symbolic cargo of the oil to be exported by the end of the month, preferably with Baghdad's consent, but without it otherwise.

"That will put additional pressure on Baghdad to negotiate with a sense of urgency," said a Kurdistan-based industry source on condition of anonymity. "We always thought that it (the pipeline) would be the catalyst for the initiation of serious discussion and resolution of the export problem."

Behind the scenes, and the hotter rhetoric, the private voices in Baghdad and Arbil are, however more united - but in pessimism that an enduring compromise can be found to a dispute that has strained Iraq's federal unity.

If a deal is elusive, the Kurds retain some powerful political cards to play in the formation of any Iraqi government after elections at the end of April. Equally, Baghdad could cut funding to the northern enclave.

Kurdish officials are positive Ankara will stand by them and publicly say they are hopeful a bargain can be struck with Baghdad, but in private admit their differences are almost insurmountable.

The latest round of talks ended inconclusively in Baghdad on Sunday. Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister for Energy Hussein al-Shahristani is due to visit the Kurdish capital Arbil for further negotiations in the coming days, although no date has been formally announced.

Turkey has sought to stay above the fray.

"We have repeatedly said, these are decisions that they will make among themselves," Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz told reporters. "I believe our brothers will meet at a good point."

Ankara may want to see a formal agreement in place before allowing continuous exports from the region, but industry sources there are sceptical any deal would hold.

"Turkey has come to a point where it has to take extra care," said one. "I don't see a lasting solution... but there could well be a temporary arrangement so that the pressure in the system can be relieved, at least in the interim."

BARGAINING IN BAGHDAD

Autonomous since 1991, Kurdistan has often chafed against central authority, and even raised the prospect of secession from Iraq, but is nonetheless reliant on Baghdad for a slice of the OPEC producer's $100 billion-plus budget.

Baghdad has warned it will sever that lifeline if the Kurds exports oil without its consent. The Iraqi cabinet this month approved a draft budget for 2014 that would slash the region's share of state revenues unless it exports 400,000 barrels of crude per day via State Oil Marketing Organisation (SOMO).

That is well above Kurdistan's current export capacity of around 255,000 bpd, industry sources say.

Officials in the region are confident the budget will not pass in parliament because most Sunni lawmakers are boycotting the assembly, and a Kurdish walkout would likely prevent a quorum.

Nonetheless, they are considering their options should it come to that.

"If Baghdad cuts the budget as they threatened, then Kurdistan has a lot of cards to play," said a senior official in Arbil on condition of anonymity. "Not allowing the flow of oil from Kirkuk to Ceyhan is one of them."

It is not clear how the Kurds would prevent pipeline oil flowing from the Kirkuk oilfields to Turkey's Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, but a stretch of it runs through their territory.

Another less provocative option would be to twist Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's arm before a parliamentary election due on April 30, in which he will need Kurdish support to win a third term or form a government.

"The threats being made today only demonstrate that oil disputes are most likely going to be on the negotiating table between Kurdish and Arab parties when forming the next government," said Ramzy Mardini, nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council.

TURKISH GAME PLAN

For Turkey, Kurdish oil will help diversify its energy supplies away from Russia and Iran and reduce a ballooning $60 billion energy bill, but the motive for better ties goes beyond hydrocarbons.

"Turkey's interest in the KRG is driven as much by geopolitics... as it is by Turkey's energy needs," said Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute.

Co-operating with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) gives Ankara additional sway over politics in Baghdad, and the relatively stable region serves as a buffer to insulate Turkey's southeastern corner against instability in the rest of Iraq.

Ankara is also counting on the KRG to help it make peace with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) rebel group, which has fought a three-decade war against it, at a cost of more than 40,000 lives on both sides.

Some PKK guerillas have withdrawn from Turkey to their bases in the mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan as part of a peace process set in motion last year.

Ankara's new approach to the Kurds was stated plainly by the Turkish foreign minister in a conversation with former U.S. army chief of staff General Ray Odierno following a 2007 PKK attack.

Ahmet Davutoglu said his government had been under pressure to retaliate against the KRG.

"We could have destroyed Arbil, but we didn't. Instead, we increased our economic interdependence with the KRG," Davutoglu said, according to a U.S. diplomatic cable dated 2010 and released by Wikileaks.

Apart from providing the landlocked Kurds with an outlet to global markets, Turkey is a crucial ally for Arbil in a hostile region following the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq.

"It's driven by a sense of mutual need on both sides," said Cagaptay. "Turkey and the Kurds need each other and I think that's going to persist in the long-term".

TRADE THREAT

At Turkey's Ceyhan, three storage tanks, each with a capacity of 2.5 million barrels, have been set aside for Kurdish oil, and industry sources say around 300,000 barrels have flowed into them so far.

The KRG has already issued a tender to sell 2 million barrels by the end of January.

The Kurds insist on selling crude independently of SOMO, which Baghdad says has exclusive rights to manage all sales of Iraqi oil.

SOMO officials have traveled to Turkey along with the head of Iraq's state-run North Oil Company to meet the deputy energy minister.

Iraqi Oil Minister Abdul Kareem Luaibi said last week Baghdad was preparing legal action against Ankara and would consider cancelling all contracts with Turkish firms if exports went ahead, putting $12 billion worth of bilateral trade a year in jeopardy.

Kurdistan used to feed crude into a Baghdad-controlled pipeline to Ceyhan, but stopped a year ago due to a row over payments.

Since then, the Kurds have been trucking smaller quantities of oil to Turkey and collecting the revenues themselves, while laying their own pipeline, which was completed late last year. (Writing by Isabel Coles; Editing by William Hardy)

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/ ... 7020140124

[Anthea]

As al-Qaeda continues to terrorize parts of Iraq, another battle looms over the country: control over Iraqi hydrocarbons and revenues.



The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is pressing ahead with its plans to independently export and sell Kurdish crude to Turkey, while Baghdad has threatened to cut the KRG’s budget and take legal action against Ankara. These tensions are occurring as oil-producing provinces are making their own oil and revenue demands, and threatening to boycott parliament and stage demonstrations.

While this type of brinkmanship is common to post-Saddam Iraqi politics, it underlines the new fault lines that have emerged between Baghdad and provincial and regional authorities. These lines indicate that a viable power-sharing arrangement will be determined by fair access and distribution of the country’s oil wealth.

The heightened energy rhetoric reflects the opportunity to maximize political interests and leverage by Erbil and Baghdad. The KRG calculates that the weakened Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki needs Kurdish backing in the forthcoming elections to win a third term. KRG support includes Peshmerga (Kurdish militia) security assistance against al-Qaeda threats, particularly in the disputed territories.

The KRG’s strengthened position also is shaped by its energy sector successes, including a newly-built pipeline that connects to the Iraqi-Turkish pipeline (ITP), oil contracts with major international oil companies (IOCs), and Turkish partnership. The KRG also is “fed up” with Baghdad and the numerous failed attempts to export its crude and secure consistent or full payment.

These developments have encouraged a more nationalist and less compromising KRG position. Whereas in 2010 the KRG recognized Iraqi State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) as having the sole right to export Kurdish crude, by 2013 it had denied SOMO’s role in Kurdish energy sector development. Instead, the KRG states that its newly created Kurdistan Oil Marketing Organization (KOMO) is now the region’s export agency. The KRG has also tendered sales of its crude in the Turkish port of Ceyhan via KOMO to affirm this right.

Baghdad, however, has a different perception of the KRG’s leverage and energy strategy. Aware of Erbil’s financial dependency on the Iraqi government and the region’s current financial woes — Sulaimaniyah banks have been without cash for weeks and civil servants have not been paid — some Iraqi officials are willing to “call the KRG’s bluff.” They, too, have heightened the threat level by using Iraq’s own trump card: withholding KRG revenues, which represent 95% of the KRG annual budget.

Baghdad also has resorted to legal action, arguing that exporting natural resources from Iraq without federal government approval is equivalent to taking confiscated or stolen property. Neither Erbil nor Ankara can therefore legally load tankers in Ceyhan and sell Kurdish crude without the risk of international arbitration from Baghdad.

The Baghdad-Erbil energy dispute also involves the Iraqi provinces, which further complicates its resolution. Despite their shared anti-Malikism, demands for greater oil revenues, rejection of the 2014 draft budget and their admiration for the KRG’s accomplishments, the provinces do not necessarily support Kurdish oil, revenue and political demands. Iraqi populations disagree with what they perceive as the KRG’s “double standards.” They argue that the KRG wants federalism on its own terms; it is part of Iraq when it is to the Kurds’ advantage (obtaining revenues), but independent at other times. Another common criticism by Arab Iraqis is that the KRG has “taken too much from Baghdad without giving anything back”.

Further, even though Basra and other oil-producing provinces have threatened to stop oil production and boycott the parliament, they do not fundamentally challenge the territorial integrity of Iraq. Their claims are based on “fairness” of revenue distribution and greater decentralization. A key demand is an increase in the government petrodollar payment from $1 to $5 per barrel. Although other provinces have attempted to follow the KRG example by signing independent contracts with IOCs, such as Salahuddin and Wasit, they later affirmed Baghdad’s sole authority over the energy sector and canceled the contracts. Even Barzani’s commercial partner in Ninevah province, Sunni Arab governor Atheel Nujaifi, has indicated that any oil development in the province would be coordinated with Baghdad.

Indeed, Maliki needs KRG support, particularly as the crisis in Anbar rages and tensions with the Sunni Arab community continue. Still, there are limits to how far Maliki can go to assuage the KRG in light of the growing demands by provincial administrations and local populations for government services and revenues — all fueled by a sense of Iraqi resource nationalism. Some Iraqi officials have argued that Maliki could even lose votes if he supports Kurdish independent export and payment demands. Others have reframed the oil imbroglio as a financial issue; a drain on the Iraqi economy that Baghdad can no longer sustain, given last year’s $18 billion budget deficit. Hence, Baghdad cannot afford to pay the KRG without Erbil’s contribution to the federal budget, which includes exporting 400,000 barrels per day via SOMO. These financial strains could increase further if Baghdad recognizes the creation of three new provinces, which would be eligible for their own budgets.

Despite the rhetoric, negotiations between Baghdad and the KRG continue, and short-term agreements are likely to be made before the April elections. Yet, the key issue of who controls oil and money extends beyond the Baghdad-Erbil dispute and into the provinces, which makes the problem a larger one of determining relative gains. For the KRG, the challenge is not only convincing Baghdad of its export and revenue rights, but other Iraqi provinces and populations who regard natural resources as part of Iraq’s national wealth to be distributed among Iraqis first. Still, the onus of responsibility lies with Baghdad. To maximize Iraqi energy sector potential, Iraqi officials will have to devise a more convincing strategy that assures its control over energy resources, incorporates the provinces and KRG fairly into this plan, and assures an equitable distribution of revenues to Iraqi populations.

Denise Natali
Columnist

http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/origina ... rzani.html

[Anthea]

Oil deal with Kurdistan cuts short Turkey-Iraq honeymoon

BAGHDAD/ANKARA/ERBIL,— It was only six months ago that Turkey and Iraq decided to leave all their old disputes behind and turn to a new page in their troubled relationship with the help of intensified diplomatic efforts and an increasing number of high-level visits; however, it didn't take long for Ankara and Baghdad to be at loggerheads again when the central Iraqi government's fears related to Turkey's independent oil deals with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) re-emerged.

It was in late September that Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said in Ankara, “It is high time to close this page [in bilateral relations] and open a new one,” during a joint press conference with his Turkish counterpart Ahmet Davutoğlu, whom he called “my dear brother,” and he went on to say that despite all differences of opinion, there aren't any problems between Turkey and Iraq that cannot be solved.

However, commitment to resolving problems fell short in the face of national interests. On Jan. 17, Reuters reported that Iraqi Oil Minister Abdul Kareem Luaibi announced that Iraq is preparing to take legal and other measures to punish Turkey for its involvement in Kurdish exports of “smuggled” oil without the central government's consent.

Although Turkey says that it is respectful of Iraq's sensitivities regarding territorial integrity and claims that it is acting in compliance with the Iraqi federal constitution that allocated shares of energy revenues to the KRG, the KRG's announcement of start of the flow of crude oil to Turkey through the new pipeline in late January angered the Baghdad government and risked the fragile thaw that had developed.

Preparations for a lawsuit against the Turkish government have begun, Luaibi reportedly said, for allowing Kurdistan to pump oil through the export pipeline without the approval of the Iraqi central government. He underlined that by signing deals without Iraqi consent, Turkey is jeopardizing bilateral trade worth $12 billion a year and he reiterated that the energy issue touches on the independence and unity of Iraq.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who had been scheduled to visit Turkey this month, also recently voiced his uneasiness with the energy deal between Ankara and Erbil, saying, “This is a constitutional violation,” during an interview with Reuters.

Meanwhile, the Turkish side is keeping its silence on the issue. Before his departure for Brussels, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said that according to the custom regarding diplomatic visits, it is Maliki's turn to come to Turkey. He added that the KRG has constitutional rights to 17 percent of the revenue from oil sales and maintained, “All of the issues beyond this are empty talk.”

Mehmet Seyfettin Erol, an academic at Ankara's Gazi University and the head of the Center for International Strategic and Security Studies (USGAM), told Sunday's Zaman that Turkey was in search of a way to revisewww.Ekurd.net its foreign relations and it had preferred to use Iraq as starting point; however, Turkey's initiative is worrisome to some countries and that's why the honeymoon between Ankara and Baghdad lasted such a short time.

“At that time Iraq had two choices: burn the bridges with Turkey and Erbil or turn to a blank page. Iraq preferred to turn to a new page; however, its decision bothered both the US and Iran. The trilateral committee of Turkey, the KRG and Iraq was spoiled after Maliki's Iran visit. The US doesn't want Turkey to follow independent policies in the region either and often urges it to see Baghdad as the legitimate addressee,” Erol said.

When asked about the calculations that Maliki made about the upcoming Iraqi election, Erol said Iraq trusts the US and Iran, and if Turkey lashes out at Iraq it will also mean opposing Washington and Tehran.

One of the reasons that Iraq looked likely to have improved relations with Turkey was the coming parliamentary elections. During the local elections held last April, Maliki's State of Law Coalition received fewer votes than expected. Seeing the reduced support from his nation, Maliki started to consult with Iraq's north and Maliki turned to Iraq's immediate neighbor, Turkey, to gain Ankara's support and get the upper hand before next April election.

Birol Akgün, an expert from the Ankara-based Institute of Strategic Thinking (SDE) agreed that although Turkey believed that it could successfully establish good relations with Iraq, Maliki's desire to keep Shiite support and Iran's effect spoiled the relationship.

“We thought that the good relations would last longer and that the normalization process would be completed. However, the biggest problem is the upcoming elections in Iraq. Maliki doesn't want to create bad relations with Shiites by taking sides with a Sunni country. There is also Iran's effect on this deterioration, due to the Syria crisis,” Akgün told Sunday's Zaman.

Yet another reason for the hiatus between Ankara and Baghdad is the fact that Iraq and the KRG haven't reached an agreement on division energy revenue shares yet, Akgün said. However, he also noted that Iraq is just bluffing, as there is no other logical route for Iraqi oil to reach to the rest of the world.

According to Akgün, until the April elections in Iraq are over, no one should expect a positive development in the relations between Turkey and Baghdad.

The crisis about Turkey having energy agreements with the KRG broke out in December 2013. Media reports said that Turkey and the KRG had signed a package of landmark deals that would see the Kurdish region's oil and gas exported via pipelines in Turkey. Although the Turkish government initially denied signing such an deals, Baghdad barred private Turkish jets from flying to Iraq's autonomous Kurdish region at a time when Energy Minister Taner Yıldız was set to travel to Erbil for an energy conference. The plane that was carrying Yıldız first landed in the Iraqi capital.

(Cihan/Today's Zaman)

Copyright ©, respective author or news agency, cihan.com.tr

http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/mi ... ey4934.htm

[Anthea]

Iraq will take action if Kurds export oil before deal reached

(Reuters) - Iraq will take action, including fiscal measures, if the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) exports oil before an agreement is reached with Baghdad, Deputy Prime Minister for Energy Hussain al-Shahristani said at a conference in London on Tuesday.

Shahristani reiterated that only Iraqi state marketer SOMO is authorized to export the country's oil.

"Any oil that leaves Iraq without the permission of SOMO is illegal and Iraq will have to take action to protect its oil wealth," Shahristani said.

"We have informed Turkey and the KRG that we cannot allow this to continue...We are waiting for a response to our latest proposal."

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/ ... IB20140128

[Anthea]

The Ministry is transparent about how the KRG's production sharing contracts work.

Ain Sifni
PSC – Hunt Oil – 08/09/2007
Assignment Novation and First Amendment Agreement – 26/07/2011
Hunt Oil Gaurantee – 26/07/2011
Hunt Oil LOR – 26/07/2011

Akri Bijeel
PSC – GKP/MOL – 06/11/2007
GKP/MOL Assignment – 22/10/2007
GKP/MOL Assignment and Novation Agreement – 30/10/2007
GKP/MOL Amendment Agreement – 01/08/2010

Arbat
PSC – Shamaran – 28/08/2009
Amendment Agreement – 01/08/2010

Atrush
PSC - Atrush - GEP - 10/11/2007
First Amendment Agreement - 01/08/2010
Marathon Gaurantee - 20/10/2010
Marathon LOR - 20/10/2010
TPI Assignment, Novation and Second Amendment Agreement - 20/10/2010

Baranan
PSC – Talisman – 15/06/2009
Assignment Agreement – 26/07/2011
Murphy LOR – 26/07/2011
Talisman LOR – 26/07/2011
Talisman/Murphy Guarantee – 26/07/2011
Murphy TPI Assignment – 26/07/2011

Barda Rash
PSC – Komet – 20/06/2008
Afren LOR – 27/07/2011
Komet/Afren First Amendment Agreement – 27/07/2011
Komet LOR – 27/07/2011
Termination Agreement – 27/07/2011
First Amendment Agreement and Completion Certificate – 07/09/2011

Bazian
PSC - KNOC - 10/11/2007
Assignment Agreement - 17/11/2008
Deed of Assignment and Novation - 12/12/2008

Ber Bahr
PSC - Genel Enerji - 31/03/2009
GKP Assignment Agreement - 16/07/2009
Assignment Novation and Amendment Agreement - 16/07/2009
Third Amendment Agreement - 01/08/2010

Bina Bawi
PSC - Oil Search/A&T - 06/03/2008
PSA - A&T - 29/03/2006
EPSA - A&T - 26/02/2007
Deed of Assignment and Novation - 01/04/2009
OMV/A&T/Hawler Energy Assignment and Second Amendment Agreement - 01/08/2010

Central Dohuk
PSC - Murphy/Petroquest - 14/10/2010
Murphy LOR - 14/10/2010

Chia Surkh
PSC - Longford/Petoil/Genel Enerji - 11/06/2009
First Amendment Agreement - Longford/Petoil/Genel Enerji - 01/08/2010

Dinarta
PSC - Dinarta - HESS - 17/06/2011
Dinarta - Petroceltic LOR - 26/07/2011
Dinarta - Gaurantee - 27/07/2011
Dinarta - HESS LOR - 26/07/2011

Duhok
PSC – DNO – 13/03/2008
Amendment and Relinquishment Agreement – 10/09/2008
Assignment Agreement – 31/03/2009
Assignment and Amendment Agreement – 31/03/2009
Third Amendment Agreement – 01/08/2010

Erbil
PSA Annex A – DNO – 25/06/2004
PSA Annex C – DNO – 25/06/2004
PSA – DNO – 25/06/2004
PSC – DNO – 13/03/2008

Garmian
PSC - Western Zagros - 25/07/2011
Western Zagros Gaurantee - 25/07/2011
Western Zagros LOR - 25/07/2011

Harir
PSC - Marathon - 20/10/2010
Marathon LOR - 20/10/2010
Marathon Gaurantee - 20/10/2010

Hawler
PSC - Norbest - 10/11/2007
KEPCO/KNOC Assignment Agreement - 17/11/2008
AOG Guarantee - 09/08/2011
AOG LOR - 09/08/2011
Confidentiality and Release Agreement - 09/08/2011
KNOC LOR - 09/08/2011
Norbest LOR - 09/08/2011
Second Amendment Agreement - 09/08/2011
Certificate of Completion Executed - 10/08/2011
Deed of Assignment and Novation

Kurdamir
EPSA - Western Zagros - 04/05/2006
EPSA - Western Zagros - 26/02/2007
PSC - Western Zagros - 28/02/2008
Completion Agreement - 19/06/2008
Talisman Third Party Agreement - 19/06/2008
Talisman Third Party Agreement Annex A - 19/06/2008
Amendment Agreement - 25/07/2011
Completion Certificate - 25/07/2011
Talisman/Western Zagros Guarantee - 25/07/2011
Talisman LOR - 25/07/2011
Western Zagros LOR - 25/07/2011
First Amendment Agreement to TPPA - 25/07/2011

Mala Omar
PSC - OMV - 06/11/2007
First Amendment Agreement - 01/08/2010
Certificate of Completion - 31/08/2010

Miran
PSC - Heritage - 01/10/2007
Heritage/Genel Enerji Assignment Agreement - 31/03/2009
Heritage/Genel Assignment and Novation Agreement - 31/03/2009
Third Amendment Agreement - 01/08/2010

Piramagrun
PSC - Repsol - 26/07/2011
Repsol Guarantee - 26/07/2011
Repsol LOR - 26/07/2011

Pulkhana
PSA - PetOil Petroleum and Petroleum Products International Exploration and Production Inc - 10/01/2003
PSC - Shamaran/Petoil - 28/08/2009
Amendment Agreement - 01/08/2010

Qala Dze
PSC – Repsol – 26/07/2011
Repsol LOR – 26/07/2011
Repsol Gaurantee – 26/07/2011

Qara Dagh
PSC - Niko/Vast/Groundstar - 28/04/2008
Niko Assignment Agreement - 28/04/2008
Assignment Novation and Amendment Agreement - 28/04/2008
Second Amendment Agreement - 01/08/2010

Qush Tapa
PSC - KNOC - 21/06/2008

Rovi
PSC – Reliance – 22/12/2006
PSC – Reliance – 06/11/2007
First Amendment Agreement – 01/08/2010
OMV/Reliance Second Amendment Agreement – 01/08/2010
Second Amendment Agreement Certificate of Completion – 31/08/2010

Safen
PSC – Marathon – 20/10/2010
Marathon LOR – 20/10/2010
Marathon Gaurantee – 20/10/2010

Sarsang
PSC – Hillwood – 06/11/2007
First Amendment Agreement – 26/08/2010
Marathon Guarantee – 20/10/2010
Marathon LOR – 20/10/2010
TPI Assignment, Novation and Second Amendment Agreement – 20/10/2010

Shaikan
PSC – GKP/MOL – 06/11/2007
First Amendment Agreement – 01/08/2010

Shakrok
PSC – Hess/Petroceltic – 26/07/2011
Hess LOR – 26/07/2011
Guarantee – 26/07/2011
Petroceltic LOR – 26/07/2011

Sangaw North
PSC - Sterling - 10/11/2007
Sterling/Addax Deed of Assignment and Novation - 15/09/2008
KNOC Assignment Agreement - 17/11/2008
Sterling/Addax/KNOC - Deed of Assignment and Novation - 12/12/2008

Sangaw South
PSC - KNOC - 21/06/2008

Sarta
PSC - Reliance - 22/12/2006
PSC - OMV - 06/11/2007
First Amendment Agreement - 01/08/2010
Second Amendment Agreement - 01/08/2010
Certificate of Completion - 31/08/2010

Shakal
PSA - PetOil Petroleum and Petroleum Products International Exploration and Production Inc - 10/01/2003
PSA - Shakal/Trilax/Petoil - 25/02/2007
PSC - Shakal/Oil Search/Petoil - 06/03/2008
Amendment Agreement - 01/08/2010

Sheikh Adi
PSC - GKP - 16/07/2009
First Amendment Agreement

Shorish
PSC - OMV - 06/11/2007
Amendment Agreement - 01/08/2010
First Amendment Completion Certificate - 31/08/2010

Sindi Amedi
PSC – Perenco – 02/10/2007
Assignment Novation and Amendment Agreement – 24/08/2011
First Amendment Completion Certificate – 24/08/2011
First Amendment Guarantee – 24/08/2011

Sulevani
PSC - Petroquest - 14/10/2010

Taq Taq
PSA - Genel Enerji - 20/01/2004
PSA - Genel Enerji - 21/11/2006
PSA Annexes A, B, C - 21/11/2006
PSC - Genel Enerji/Addax - 26/02/2008
First Amendment Agreement - 01/08/2010
Taq Taq: PSA Attachments - Genel Enerji - 2002
Taq Taq: PSA - Genel Enerji - 2002

Tawke
PSA – DNO – 25/06/2004
PSC - DNO - 13/03/2008
Confirmation Agreement - 10/09/2008
Indemnity Agreement - 10/09/2008
Amendment and Relinquishment Agreement - 10/09/2008
Assignment and Amendment Agreement - 31/03/2009
Border Adjustment Amendment - 30/07/2009
Sixth Amendment Agreement - 01/08/2010

Taza
PSC - Oil Search/Shamaran - 27/07/2011
Guarantee - 27/07/2011
Shamaran LOR - 27/07/2011
Oil Search LOR - 27/07/2011
Amended K42 Option Agreement - 28/08/2009
Oil Search K42 Option Agreement - 16/07/2009
Oil Search K42 Option Agreement PSC Annex - 16/07/2009

Topkhana
PSC - Talisman - 19/08/2011
Option Agreement - 19/06/2008


The Ministry has also made available the production sharing contracts signed with production and exploration companies. Follow this link - then click on the links to read them (the files are very large and can take up to five minutes to open).

http://mnr.krg.org/index.php/en/the-min ... scs-signed

Link to diagram showing location of oil fields:

http://mnr.krg.org/images/topstories/We ... Final-.jpg

[Anthea]

Oryx Petroleum announces update for Banan-1 exploration well in Kurdistan Region of Iraq

Oryx Petroleum Corporation Limited announces an update on its drilling activities at Banan and Demir Dagh in the Hawler license area in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Oryx Petroleum is the operator and has a 65% participating and working interest in the Hawler license area.

Commenting today, Henry Legarre, Oryx Petroleum's Chief Operating Officer, stated:

"Our exploration and appraisal activities in the Hawler license area continue to progress. We have completed drilling the Banan exploration well targeting one of the largest prospects in our portfolio. Hydrocarbons were encountered in the Cretaceous, Upper and Lower Jurassic and Triassic and we are now commencing a testing program. We have successfully re-completed the Demir Dagh-2 well and we are making excellent progress with the Demir Dagh-3 and Demir Dagh-4 appraisal wells. Observations during drilling of all wells on the Demir Dagh structure continue to be encouraging."

Banan Exploration Well

As previously reported, the KS Discoverer 1 rig spudded the BAN-1 well, the Corporation's fourth exploration well in the Hawler license area, targeting the Banan prospect, in mid-September. The BAN-1 well is targeting oil potential in the Cretaceous, Upper and Lower Jurassic and the Triassic. Netherland, Sewell & Associates, Inc. ("NSAI") estimates as of March 31, 2013 were that the Banan prospect contains 196 MMbbl of best estimate unrisked gross (100%) prospective oil resources (risked: 102 MMbbl). NSAI's estimate excludes a significant portion of the Banan prospect that was outside the Hawler license area boundaries prior to the boundary extension agreed to with the KRG in December 2012. See "Reserves and Resources Advisory" below for additional information regarding this estimate. Recently acquired 2D seismic data over the extension area has confirmed that the likely crest of the Banan structure is significantly up-dip of the BAN-1 well.

The BAN-1 well was planned to be drilled to a total depth of 4,153 metres in the Kurra Chine formation. The well experienced a significant pressure kick while drilling at approximately 4,000 metres in a fractured section of the Kurra Chine. During the following well control operation, light oil from the Kurra Chine formation was burned at the flare.. As the well had not been designed for conditions encountered in the Triassic, the well was plugged back to 3,400 metres in preparation for testing operations in the shallower Cretaceous and Jurassic formations. A future appraisal well with modified well design, if pursued, should enable evaluation of the Kurra Chine formation in the Banan structure.

As previously reported, logging data, core analysis and observations during drilling in the Upper Cretaceous (Shiranish, Kometan and Upper Qamchuqa formations) confirmed the presence of hydrocarbons and similar reservoir properties, including matrix porosity, as observed at Demir Dagh. Logging data and observations during drilling, including free oil on the shakers and cuttings, also confirm the presence of hydrocarbons in the Upper Jurassic (Najmah formation) and Lower Jurassic (Mus & Base Alan, Adaiyah, and Butmah formations). Losses of drilling fluids also indicated existence of a permeable fracture network. These are encouraging indications, however, no conclusions with regards to recoverability or commerciality of any hydrocarbons can be reached until the testing program is conducted.

Oryx Petroleum's testing program for BAN-1 consists of five firm cased-hole drill stem tests ("DSTs") and one contingent cased-hole DST. It is expected that the testing program will conclude in March 2014. Should the testing be successful, the Corporation is considering accelerating plans to drill an appraisal well on the crest of the Banan structure.

Demir Dagh Appraisal

The Sakson Hilong-10 rig spudded the first well in the Demir Dagh appraisal program (DD-3) in mid-November and is expected to reach a total depth of 4,115 metres and conclude testing and completion in Q2 2014. The well is being drilled on the axis of the anticline approximately three kilometres to the southeast of the DD-2 discovery well and will test the Cretaceous, Jurassic and Triassic reservoirs. The DD-3 well is currently on schedule, having reached a depth of approximately 3,800 metres in the Triassic. Drilling experience to date with DD-3 has been consistent with the drilling of the DD-2 discovery well.

The Romfor 22 rig successfully re-completed the DD-2 in the Upper Cretaceous reservoirs. The re-completion will enable oil production from DD-2 once the production facilities at Demir Dagh are operational, which is expected in Q2 2014. The Romfor 22 rig has since spudded the DD-4 appraisal well, which is planned to be completed in the Cretaceous reservoirs. The well is being drilled down dip on the southern flank of the anticline in order to determine the depth of the Cretaceous oil-water contact. DD-4 has reached a depth of approximately 1,800 metres and is expected to reach total depth and conclude testing in late Q1 2014.

http://www.oilvoice.com/n/Oryx_Petroleu ... c3dcf.aspx

[Piling]

First KRG Ministry of Natural Resources Monthly Report is Published

Erbil, Kurdistan Region, Iraq -The KRG Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) announces the publication of its first Monthly Report.

The Report contains the latest information on production and export in the Kurdistan Region, domestic refining and consumption, well activity, rig counts and map, employment figures and updates on Production Sharing Contracts.

The report will help interested citizens, companies and the media to closely follow the activities and progress of the oil industry in the Kurdistan Region. New information sections will be added over the coming months.

The first report, published today, covers activities in the month of October, 2013. Reports for November and December 2013 are being prepared and will appear in mid-February. Thereafter, it will be published monthly.

The Monthly Report is part of MNR’s ongoing commitment to transparency. Each report will be in English and Kurdish and will be posted every month on MNR’s website when it will be announced soon. Hard copies will also be available. An Arabic version is under preparation.

You cab read or download the report here : http://www.ekrg.org/krg/pdf/MNR_October ... NG_V10.pdf