http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1999/issue4/jv3n4a5.html
Volume 3, No. 4 - December 1999
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THE ALEVI OF ANATOLIA
By David Zeidan
Abstract: Many Middle Eastern state governments, including Turkey, have tended to deny or ignore ethnic diversity, promote one specific identity as unitary, monolithic, and characteristic of the entire population. In Turkey, the suppression of minority identities has affected the little-known Alevi population, an ethnic group that has not received much attention in the english-speaking world. The recent resurgence of Sunni fundamentalism in Turkey and the state’s adoption of a Turkish-Sunni national identity has heightened the Alevis’ problem.
Middle Eastern society is to a large extent still vertically segmented into ethnic/religious communities with complex allegiances that rise to the surface in times of stress. Contrary to the official state line of a monolithic population, Turkey is no exception: Turkish society exhibits great variety in its composition. (1) This is especially evident in rural areas where populations live naturally with their regional, religious, and ethnic differences.(2) These cleavages have also been transported to Turkey’s urban areas by massive rural migration.
Turkey’s main ethnic divide concerns the Kurdish population of southeastern Turkey, whose separatist struggle, especially as waged by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), has made headlines around the world. A lesser known minority is the Alevi community.(3)
Numbering about 15 million persons, the Alevis account for some 25 percent of Turkey’s population and constitute the country’s second largest religious community, after the Sunnis. Most Alevis are ethnically and linguistically Turkish, descended mainly from Central and Eastern Anatolia, though some 20 percent are Kurds.(4) Alevis use Turkish rather than Arabic for their religious ceremonies and literature.(5)
Alevis go by a number of names. They are called Kizilbash after the Turkemen followers of the Safavid Sufi order of the 15th and 16th centuries from which they emerged, and also Bektashi, after the Anatolian Bektashi Shi’a Sufi order founded in the 13th century to which many belong.(6) Other names include Tahtaci, Abdal, Cepni, and Zaza, which signify specific tribal and linguistic identities.(7) Note that Alevis are distinct from the Arabic-speaking extreme-Shi’a Alawis of Syria and Southwest Turkey.
Alevis traditionally inhabit rural Central and Eastern Anatolia, in particular the triangle Kayseri-Sivas-Divirgi. Kurdish Alevis are mainly found in the Tunceli, Elazig and Mus provinces of Southeastern Anatolia, and some tribal settlement of Tahtaci and Cepni exist on the Mediterranean coast. Many Alevis have migrated from their rural villages, which tend to be peripheral and underdeveloped, to the large industrialized cities of Western Turkey and to Western Europe, mainly Germany.
While there are many sub-groups among Alevis, the community tends to close ranks when it comes to the Sunni world, employing an “us” versus “them” approach and emphasizing its position as a marginalized religious/ethnic minority.(8) Observers in rural Anatolia have noticed stark differences between neighboring Alevi and Sunni villages.(9)
Alevi opposition to the Sunni Ottomans in the 16th century resulted in geographical and social marginalization.(10) In order to survive despite majority hostility and persecution, the Alevis developed into an endogamous religious community with definite ethnic markers and a tight social-religious network. Like Druze, Shi’a, and Alawis they practiced dissimulation and secrecy about their religion (taqiya). Not having a central religious authority, Alevis form a complex matrix of overlapping groupings based on lineage, regional, and Sufi order links.
Despite the Turkish republic’s avowedly secular stance, Sunni Islam has, especially since the 1980s, been supported as a quasi-state religion, much to the Alevis’ detriment.(11) Traditionally branded as heretics by the Sunnis, the Alevis still carry the stigma of being sectarian “others” today. Many Sunnis think the Alevis are unclean, practice immorality and orgies, and are not true Muslims. (12) Centuries of persecution, prejudice and misconceptions at the hands of the majority Sunnis have resulted in a persistent social gap between the Sunni and Alevi Turks.
Turkey’s secular elite and military tend to view the Sunni/Alevi rift as artificial and manipulated by various interest groups. However, the sectarian differences are deeply rooted in Turkish society, and today they operate in the context of mass media, the information revolution, and financial support of fundamentalism by the rich Oil states.(13)
Fears that Alevism would lose its unique characteristics were put to rest in the mid-1980s when, in the face of modernization, the Alevi community began to reconstruct and transform its communal identity patterns, and reformulate its traditions. This process is linked to a politicization of group members and an assertive reaffirmation of the collective Alevi identity. (14)
The weakening of Kemalist secularism in the 1990s has yielded two paradoxical trends for the Alevis. First, they have been threatened by the rise of fundamentalist Sunni political parties, which now constitute a significant bloc in the Turkish parliament, and even fielded Turkey’s first ever Islamist prime minister. (15) At the same time, Turkey’s liberalization and the growth of civil society has encouraged an Alevi revival which includes the founding of hundreds of Alevi religious societies in major cities and the public practice of Alevi rituals, kept hidden not so long ago.