Kurdistan independence related articles & photos

[zaxo10]

Come on KRG what are you waiting for ?? declare independence!!

[alan131210]

Patience my friend let the pipelines finish now we also have a chance of building them thru WK to med sea

That is another reason milky wanted to invade SK and WK border but boy he failed

[zaxo10]

Patience my friend let the pipelines finish now we also have a chance of building them thru WK to med sea

That is another reason milky wanted to invade SK and WK border but boy he failed

Which kurdish city in rojava is near med sea??

[alan131210]

Patience my friend let the pipelines finish now we also have a chance of building them thru WK to med sea

That is another reason milky wanted to invade SK and WK border but boy he failed

Which kurdish city in rojava is near med sea??

Jisr shax'ur then Efrin

[zaxo10]

Jisr shax'u...??? :s kurdish city? I saw à demo from Jisr shax'u it was only syria flag and some turkish flag...

[alan131210]

Jisr shax'u...??? :s kurdish city? I saw à demo from Jisr shax'u it was only syria flag and sonen turkish flag...

Show us !?

[zaxo10]

Jisr shax'u...??? :s kurdish city? I saw à demo from Jisr shax'u it was only syria flag and sonen turkish flag...

Show us !?

Whrite On youtube " Jisr Shakur Town June 3 "

[alan131210]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sKkf7SSIAYQ&feature=g-all-u&hl=en&fs=1&rel=0&hd=1   

[alan131210]

[11:49] 12/Aug/02

Less than a year after the departure of U.S. troops from Iraq, Baghdad is losing a primary lever over independent-minded Kurdistan -- its grip on the northern region's revenue-earning oil industry. Kurdistan's secret weapon? Foreign oil companies are exasperated with Baghdad's stinginess and allured by the Kurds' more liberal terms for oil contracts.

These companies are becoming an unintentional fifth column in Kurdistan's march toward economic autonomy. On July 31, France's Total became the third big oil company to break with Baghdad by signing an unsanctioned oil deal with Kurdistan. Baghdad, intent on full mastery over the nation's massive petroleum revenue, forbids oil companies from dealing directly with Kurdistan and instead requires them to bid for projects through the Ministry of Oil and to ship their oil through Baghdad-controlled pipelines. However, ExxonMobil, Chevron, and Total have now flouted Baghdad's wishes, putting their oil deals in Iraq's south at risk in the process. Their calculus is that despite the relative inferiority of Kurdistan's oil reserves, the potential upside there outweighs the downside threat of possibly losing access to Iraq proper, according to oil company executives with whom I have spoken.

The pressure will now be on Baghdad to somehow stem what is looking like an oil-company rebellion. It's yet another challenge for the Iraqi government, which is already struggling with rising violence and dropping oil revenue because of sagging global prices.

History has seen numerous states taken over by companies -- one thinks, for instance, of the United Fruit Company's activities in Latin America. But should this trend continue in Kurdistan, it would mark, as far as I recall, the first time that oil companies have been principal actors in a nation becoming effectively autonomous. Of course, it will be up to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to ensure that it is not swallowed up by the companies, which was the fate of some Central and South American countries in the 19th and early 20th centuries.


On the surface, the companies' decision to spurn Baghdad seems foolish. Iraq is a huge prize in the oil business, with some 148 billion barrels of proven oil reserves -- the second-largest conventional volume in the world. By comparison, the KRG claims to have another 45 billion barrels of oil under its own soil.

After Saddam Hussein's overthrow in 2003, oil companies from around the world rushed in for the right to both rework old, debilitated fields, and to drill new ones. But Baghdad has exacted tight-fisted terms, signing only low-paying service contracts that effectively turn high-risk, high-return wildcatters into mere hired hands. Until recently, the world's oil companies have bristled at the terms, but gone along in hopes of conventional production sharing agreements down the road. Now, the grumbling in the ranks is growing to a roar.

A fourth-round auction of oil properties in May showed both that Baghdad seems to have no intention of greater generosity -- and also that the companies are fed up. Just three of 12 blocks on offer found successful takers.

In October, ordinarily ultraconservative Exxon uncharacteristically signaled the first sign of upheaval by signing an exploration deal with Kurdistan despite having an agreement to produce oil at Iraq's West Qurna field. That seemed quite a gamble: West Qurna, after all, holds some 8.7 billion barrels of oil, and there was a distinct possibility that Baghdad would revoke the deal as punishment for Exxon's opening to the Kurds. Now, Total's decision -- the purchase of a 35 percent stake in two exploration blocks in Kurdistan -- makes what had been a gingerly tip-toeing toward the KRG look more like a headlong rush. Total did not respond to an email requesting comment.

Punishment has been meted out for the companies' defiance: Exxon was barred from the latest auction, and Chevron, which has no current deal in the south, has been officially blacklisted from any future contracts. However, the companies don't seem fazed in the least.

"We understand completely that if we enter into a contract in the north, we're probably going to be blackballed in the south," an official from one of the companies told me on condition of anonymity. "So the question is, 'Have we exhausted all our options for getting a deal in the south on terms that we would find acceptable?'"

The answer for companies headed for the door is yes, the official said. "I think that's beginning to be borne out as a lot of companies are looking to renegotiate their terms," he told me.

"The terms in the north are much better. The government gets a stake, but the better you do, the more you get, and the terms are attractive," he said. Plus the overall conditions are "night and day better" in Kurdistan than in Baghdad, he said. "You fly into a very modern, efficient airport. There are good hotels, good infrastructure."

When combined with the Kurdish authorities' already-existing plans to build independent oil and natural gas export pipelines out of Kurdistan that avoid the Arab regions of Iraq entirely, the oil deals look increasingly like a robust, commercial-led carving out of the region as a stand-alone entity. Some might call it another substantial piece of the puzzle toward the creation of the Kurds' longstanding national dream -- a state of their own.

Robin Mills, a former Shell geologist and author of The Myth of the Oil Crisis who does private consulting on Iraq, said in a Twitter exchange that the Total news is a "big blow" for Baghdad. As for Total itself, the company seemed to be taking on sub-par fields in Kurdistan -- "not a crown jewel in return for risk they're taking with Baghdad" -- but that "perhaps Total just doesn't see any risk with Baghdad any more."

Can the embattled Iraqi central government get the rebellious oil companies back in line? Patrick Osgood, deputy editor of Oil & Gas Middle East magazine, suggested in a tweet that Baghdad could respond by making "a quick fire sale [of Total's fields] to Petrochina," the publicly traded arm of the state-controlled China National Petroleum Company. But even that may not solve Baghdad's basic problem: "Can't see it's smart for Baghdad to be so reliant on Shell, BP, Russians & Chinese," Mills said.

Some messages that run counter to conventional wisdom stand out from this showdown: Oil companies, it turns out, will not pay any price for access to the biggest fields in the world, but in fact will seek greener pastures. Oil cannot be bottled up -- it will find its market. And sometimes, a new state can take form without a shot fired or a single protester in the street.

By Steve LeVine

Foreign Policy

[Kurdistano]

Jisr shax'u...??? :s kurdish city? I saw à demo from Jisr shax'u it was only syria flag and sonen turkish flag...

Show us !?

Whrite On youtube " Jisr Shakur Town June 3 "

I have seen the demo Jisr shakur is not entirely Kurdish yet by majority- If the Syrian army mobilizes all Arabs on the streets of course it will look much.

[alan131210]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q3_6JJx-ASo&feature=player_embedded&hl=en&fs=1&rel=0&hd=1   

[Cewlik]

Barzani: Kurdistan will become self-sufficient in fuel and electricity

ERBIL, Aug.7 (AKnews)- Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani said that the policy of his government aims at self-sufficiency for Kurdistan in fuel and electricity generation.

The PM made the remark during a meeting in Kurdistan Parliament for discussing the creation of a Supreme Negotiations Council for settling disputes with Baghdad.

Barzani said it is a while Baghdad government is cutting Kurdistan's share from the fuel produced at the Iraqi refineries. It has cut Erbil's share completely.

He continued it is not feasible for Baghdad to cut Kurdistan's share of fuel or electricity under every pretext daily.

"Therefore, in these two fields we will have our independence and will provide the demand of the [Kurdistan] region," Barzani said.

A number of issues between KRG and Baghdad are yet to be settled. Among them are the status and salary of peshmarga (Kurdistan border guards), the ownership of some multiethnic areas and the oil contracts signed by the KRG.

The oil contracts have become a highly sensitive subject as Baghdad labels the contracts illegal and presses the foreign companies to quit investment in Kurdistan fields.

Kurdistan and Baghdad official also accuse each other of smuggling oil and a vague dealing with oil file.

Whenever there is any tension between KRG and Baghdad, the latter puts pressure on the former by cutting its share of fuel.

http://aknews.com/en/aknews/2/320597/

[burnsss]

The corrupt and incompetent Iraqi government is using the electricity and fuel as pressure to subdue the kurds. This is of course illegal and immoral and Barzani is wise enough to invest in these areas and foiled their plans.

[alan131210]

By Musa Keilani

Sunday, 12 August 2012
Musa Keilani

Does the move by the regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad to hand over control of six Kurdish-dominated towns in the north to the Kurds set the ground for the eventual creation of an independent Kurdish state in the region?

On the face of it, the Syrian regime has granted “autonomy” to the Kurdish areas and redeployed government forces from there, leaving Kurdish fighters to take over the security responsibility in this area. The move last month was seen as an effort to beef up the regime’s war for control of the northern province of Aleppo.

One thing is clear: Short of another war, the Syrian regime will never be able to reclaim the Kurdish areas to its control.

Turkey, which is fighting a war with Kurdish separatists, is watching the situation closely. It has warned that the main Kurdish rebel group, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), has set up presence in the area. Ankara has threatened to retaliate with force if the PKK and its affiliates set up an autonomous Kurdistan in north Syria and staged cross-border attacks in Turkey.

The PKK’s Syrian affiliate, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), has warned that it would not allow the anti-Assad revolt to spread to the Kurdish-dominated areas of Syria. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) has also accused the group of hindering its operations in some areas in the north.

Syria also has the Kurdish National Council, a coalition of 11 Kurdish parties that is linked to the Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq. They are also opposed to allowing the anti-regime revolt to be waged from the areas under their control.

The 20 million plus Kurds — mostly in Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran — have made no secret of their desire to set up an independent state. They have been restrained by their host governments from advancing their cause.

Reports indicate that the PKK has been busy exploiting the chaos in Syria in anticipation of setting up the first phase of what it hopes will be an independent Kurdistan. PKK flags are said to be already flying in the Kurdish areas of Syria, in full view of the Turks across the border.

Kurdish commentators say that Kurds “liberated” the six districts in north Syria. They accuse Damascus of having followed, for the last eight decades, a policy of “pervasive institutionalised racism and marginalisation put in place since the French mandate of 1924.”

The Kurdish Regional Government of northern Iraq is closely involved in what appears to be preparations for a declaration of Kurdish independence in northern Syria.

Obviously, the Iraqi Kurds see such a move as a litmus test. They want to see how the regional governments will respond if the Kurds move towards independence.

Amir Sharifi, president of Kurdish American Education Society in California, argues that the latest developments in Kurdish areas in Syria reflect the Kurds’ “firm will to put an end to their depravation, despair, and despondency in a pro-democracy and secular movement.”

“The liberated areas offer a new possibility for emancipation and autonomy and yet they could also highlight the political peril that awaits Kurds in Syria.

While it is plainly understandable for Kurds to use the favourable circumstances to reassert their legitimate historical rights, the regional and international response to proclaiming autonomy would appear to be ambivalent at best and hostile at worst,” writes Sharifi.

On the practical side, one of the key considerations is whether the area has the economical potential to survive as an independent entity.

Denise Naftali, an expert in Kurdish affairs and author of “The Kurdish Quasi-State: Development and Dependency in Post Gulf War Iraq”, writes: “Some argue that the increasing presence of major oil companies in the Kurdish north provides the economic leverage needed for independence. Others see the political vacuum in Syria as an impetus for a Syrian Kurdish state or autonomous region, one that could potentially merge into a greater Kurdistan with access to the sea.

“Yet, while stirring nationalist rhetoric and investor confidence, these claims ignore regional geopolitics, security issues and political trends that make statehood highly unlikely. Rising Iraqi nationalism, conflicting aims in Syria and a strengthening PKK problem have intensified divisions not only between Baghdad and Irbil, but also between Kurdish groups inside and across the Kurdistan region. The real concern is not a potential Iraqi Kurdish state, but the extent to which Iraq Kurdish autonomy can be sustained and the compromises needed to advance energy-sector development.”

However, it will be the regional governments that will determine the course of the Kurdish drive for independence. The governments of Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran are bitter opponents of Kurdish independence and will not hesitate to unleash their military powers to preempt that possibility.

For the moment, the Syrian move to grant autonomy to Syrian Kurds has led to a sense of unity among the Kurdish groups in the region. It is largely up to them to decide how best to take their struggle further. But they need strong cohesion and excellent political acumen to achieve their goal of independence.
It should be mentioned that the first advocate calling for a unified Kurdish state was a Jordanian intellectual, Ali Seido al-Kurdi, who had earlier served as an ambassador to Saudi Arabia. His book about the “Kurdish State” was first published in 1929.

[alan131210]

This is a cross post by bananabrain from The Spittoon

I must start by declaring an interest here, not only as someone who supports a fair and equitable end to the Arab-Israeli conflict in which Israel’s future is secured and a wider lasting peace in the middle east for all its peoples, but also as someone many of whose ancestors came from Mosul and Kirkuk in Kurdistan. I have met many talented Kurds and they have invariably been the sort of people who I could get along with and do business with; reasonable, rational and sensitive to the realities of history and politics.

For all these reasons, the issue of Kurdistan has been close to my heart for a number of years; it felt very much to me as if it was a pipe-dream, given the geopolitical status quo. the basics are this:

There are something like 40-50 million Kurds, spread over mountainous territory which is probably some of the most geopolitically sensitive in the world: eastern Turkey, northern Syria, Iraq, Iran and a small part of Armenia. Kurds have their own Indo-European language, although their society is highly tribalised and split between Sunni Islam of the Shafi’i school (about 3/5), mainstream Twelver Shi’ism, a number of sects such as Alevis and a couple of ancient indigenous religions, of which the most famous is Yezidism. They are the largest ethnic group without an independent nation.

The Kurds are also oppressed, marginalised and brutalised in Turkey, Iraq and Iran. in Turkey, even the word “Kurd” and their language is banned, Kurds being forcibly described as “mountain Turks”. In Iraq, the Kurdish autonomous area is probably the least of the post-Saddam basket cases – they have plenty of oil and the memory of the atrocities at Halabja give them reason to fear and suspect their southern neighbours. In Iran, repression of all non-Shi’a religion is de rigeur, with a hefty dose of ethnic prejudice.

There has never been an independent Kurdistan in the modern period, largely because of the geopolitics. The Kurds sit on a volatile faultline, between the Turks and the Russians in the Caucasus, between the Turks and the Iranians in Syria and between the Sunni and Shi’a in Iraq. Given the interest of the Russians in maintaining their influence in the area, they would rather maintain the status quo. Given the importance of Turkish influence in the Levant and the 10+m Kurds that live within Turkish borders, any loss of control along that faultline is ruthlessly resisted from Ankara. similarly, in the Iranian attempt to extend the “Shi’a crescent” from the gulf to the Mediterranean, the Assad regime, as is already common knowledge, is a key component of grand strategy. Since the Syrian rebellion, the Kurds have been allowed to assert themselves, which is presumably intended to unsettle the Turks and draw them into the field, as they fear an resurgence of the Marxist PKK, a violent group considered terrorists by the EU and NATO as well as Turkey, but often supported and encouraged by the Assad regime for their own ends as and when it suited them.

The geopolitical balance in the region has long been between Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel. The Saudis have an interest in anything that upsets Iran, as well as anything which undermines a resurgence of the historic primacy of Turkey and much of the funding for the Syrian rebellion is coming out of the gulf. To the extent that the Kurds upset both Turkey and Iran, they will be likely to support an increasingly assertive Kurdish nation. The interesting thing here is the Israelis, who have never been in conflict with the Kurds as opposed to the Iranians and Arabs. However, any support for Kurdish self-determination was overruled by their friendly relations with the Turks, far more powerful and influential and far more worrying to the Arabs and Iranians. However, since the Turkish government began pursuing a more Islamist and anti-Israel line, culminating in serious international incidents from the IHH flotilla to insulting and immature diplomatic behaviour on both sides, many have begun to speculate as to whether Israel can maintain friendly relations with turkey in the long-term. If Turkey is determined to break with Israel, it would be logical for the Israelis to look elsewhere for friends. With Egypt going Islamist and chaos in Syria and Iraq, Kurdistan would be an obvious choice for Israeli support in advance of their interests, with the ability to project power into Syria, Iraq and Iran and as leverage with Turkey.

The international powers are another factor – Turkey has been much cultivated as a potential recruit to the EU, but with the Euro in crisis, the Turks have gone cold on this particular opportunity. they are now looking at extending their power east and south, as the north is blocked by Russia and the Caucasus. In the aftermath of the Iraq war and with jihadism largely a spent force in geopolitical terms, the United States will be less interested in counterbalancing Iran, a regional player at best, if they can rely on the Turks to do so. On the other hand, with the Russians eyeing their southern border, a non-Arab, non-Iranian influence with forbidding, mountainous territory could be ideal for the Americans to garner influence, particularly if they can use the Israelis to that end and have learned the lessons of the last forbidding, mountainous area where they used tribal power to combat Russian influence.

If the Kurds are smart, they will take this opportunity as a chance to change the strategic logic. The last time this kind of strategic realignment was possible was in 1990, when the Turks and the Syrians were part of the anti-Saddam coalition – their price being a free hand for him to deal with the Kurds in the north, for which he needed to be left in place – otherwise, he could have been removed easily enough at the time. It is not hard to conclude that this was not done at the time because it was still thought that Iraq could be maintained as an integral state, rather than the three regions controlled by Sunnis, Shi’as and Kurds that it actually is. The break-up of Iraq in 1990 would have led to calls for an independent Kurdistan and that would have been fatal for the coalition. This is no longer the case – Iraq and Syria are disintegrating, the Iranians are exerting themselves and the Turks are turning away from their former allies and friends. while Turkey and Iran are distracted with Syria and with the Israelis on the outs with Turkey and looking to pressurise the Iranians, now is a golden opportunity. Britain also has strong links with Kurdistan through a vibrant and hard-working Kurdish community, particularly in London; we have made few friends in the middle east since the 1990s – support for an independent Kurdistan would change the balance of power in the middle east and it is hard to see how the righting of a historic injustice could do anything but improve the situation.

spittoon.org