Is Al Qaeda About to Establish an Emirate in Northern Syria

[Anthea]

Al Qaeda Is About to Establish an Emirate in Northern Syria

After years on the back foot, the Nusra Front is laying the groundwork for al Qaeda’s first sovereign state.

Al Qaeda has big ambitions in Syria. For the past three years, an unprecedented number of veteran figures belonging to the group have arrived in the country, in what can only be described as the covert revitalization of al Qaeda’s central leadership on Europe’s doorstep. Now the jihadi group’s Syrian affiliate, the Nusra Front — having spent nearly five years slowly building deep roots in the country — is laying the groundwork for al Qaeda’s first sovereign state.

The Islamic State and al Qaeda use different tactics in Syria, but their ultimate objective there is the same: the creation of an Islamic emirate. Whereas the Islamic State has imposed unilateral control over populations and rapidly proclaimed independence, al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate has moved much more deliberately, seeking to build influence in the areas they hope to rule. This is a long-game strategy that the terrorist group began adopting in the late 2000s, first in Yemen, in 2011, and then in Mali, in 2012.

But the Nusra Front in Syria has proved the first potentially successful test case. After years of painstaking work to increase its sway in northern Syria, Nusra Front recently launched consultations within its own ranks and among some sympathetic opposition groups about proclaiming an emirate. Given the stakes involved, al Qaeda has recently transferred a number of highly influential jihadi figures from its central leadership circles into Syria. Their mission is to assuage the concerns expressed by other Syrian Islamist movements and those members of Nusra Front who, for now, oppose the idea of an independent emirate.

The presence of a militarily powerful and socially accepted al Qaeda emirate in northwestern Syria, led by several dozen veteran al Qaeda figures and heavily manned by local Syrian fighters, could have significant consequences for the Syrian crisis and for international security.

The formalization of Nusra Front’s power in northern Syria would harden the group’s stance toward Syria’s moderate opposition. Proclaiming an emirate would require the group to assert overwhelming control — including the imposition of a strict interpretation of sharia — in the territories over which it would be asserting sovereignty. In all likelihood, incidents of capital punishment would dramatically increase, civilian freedoms would be restricted, and Nusra Front’s tolerance of nonreligious, nationalist, and civil opposition bodies would decline.

The international implications of an emirate proclamation would be even more significant. The combination of an al Qaeda emirate and a revitalized al Qaeda central leadership in northern Syria would represent a confidence boost for the jihadi organization’s global brand. Al Qaeda would present itself as the smart, methodical, and persistent jihadi movement that, in contrast to the Islamic State, had adopted a strategy more aligned with everyday Sunni Muslims. Eventually, the decision would be made to initiate the plotting of foreign attacks, using Syria’s proximity to Europe and al Qaeda’s regional network to pose a far more urgent threat than the group ever posed in Yemen and Afghanistan. Should the Islamic State continue to suffer losses to its territorial claims in Iraq and Syria, we might also see some defections to the emboldened al Qaeda affiliate next door.

How close is al Qaeda to proclaiming a Syrian emirate? Nusra Front seems to have slowed its emirate plans, at least temporarily, during Syria’s recent cessation of hostilities. That had allowed Syrian Islamist opposition groups to express their hostility to the group’s emirate plans. Some even raised the idea that Nusra Front should break its ties to al Qaeda in order to further integrate into the mainstream “revolutionary opposition.”

“For a short time, some consultation began outside of al-Nusra, but the response was very negative,” one well-connected Syrian Islamist said. “Syrians do not want an emirate.”

The influential Syrian Islamist continued: “Since then, al-Nusra has refocused the consultation to within its own community, as that experience made some of al-Nusra’s Shura Council want to wait longer [before establishing an emirate], while others say it is their right to do it now. It is a very difficult discussion.”

But now, with the cessation of hostilities effectively over and the political process in Geneva falling apart, Nusra Front’s leverage on the ground is increasing once again. The group is rebuilding a military coalition and plans to soon initiate major offensive operations south of Aleppo in order to spoil an attempt by the United States and Russia to introduce a truce in that city.

If such escalatory conditions persist, the West’s best hope of thwarting al Qaeda’s ambitions is to dramatically scale up assistance to vetted military and civil components of the mainstream opposition inside Syria. Nusra Front has acquired its influence in Syria precisely because more moderate elements of the opposition have received insufficient backing to compete with its battlefield power and capacity to control territory. That needs to change.

Whether we like it or not, the United States and its allies are now in an urgent battle for influence with al Qaeda’s most effective and successful affiliate yet. The consequences of ignoring, or losing, that battle are potentially catastrophic.

Al Qaeda Central comes to Syria

Veteran and senior al Qaeda figures began arriving in Syria in mid-2013, seeking to bolster Nusra Front’s leadership. The Islamic State’s aggressive emergence in Syria in April that year had resulted in the defection of a majority of Nusra Front’s foreign fighters to its side, spurring al Qaeda to reassert its jihadi “weight” there. Among the earliest arrivals were a third cousin of Osama bin Laden, Abdulmohsen Abdullah Ibrahim al-Sharikh (known as Sanafi al-Nasr); al Qaeda’s leader in Iran, Muhsin al-Fadhli; several veteran commanders on Saudi Arabia’s most wanted list, including Abdullah Suleiman Salih al-Dhabah (Abu Ali al-Qasimi); and major Syrian jihadi figures with decades of combat experience, like Radwan Nammous (Abu Firas al-Suri) and Abu Hammam al-Suri.

For al Qaeda, establishing a durable presence in Syria represented an invaluable opportunity. The country is close to Europe, shares a border with Israel, and can benefit from jihadi facilitation, recruitment, and logistical support from Iraq, Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. Theologically, Syria also stands at the heart of many apocalyptic prophesies from the Hadith regarding the end of the world and armies of holy warriors emanating from its territories.

From mid-2012 until mid-2014, Nusra Front had emphasized its military contribution and aversion to corruption while downplaying its jihadi ideology. Syrians had therefore accepted and often even embraced its role on the battlefield, even as they privately expressed concerns about its long-term intentions. However, the Islamic State’s proclamation of a caliphate in June 2014 posed a substantial challenge to the jihadi credibility of Nusra Front, which until that moment had controlled no territory unilaterally, frequently cooperated with nationalist forces to govern areas, and was only imposing a bare minimum of sharia law.

In the time since, the al Qaeda affiliate has slowly revealed more and more of its extremist face while trying to avoid risking its accepted status within the mainstream opposition. Nonetheless, concerns about Nusra Front’s long-term intentions for Syria did begin to emerge among other opposition groups in late 2014 — around the same time that the United States initiated airstrikes against apparent Nusra Front cells allegedly planning attacks on the West.

This sparked the group’s partial “re-moderation” in late 2014 and early 2015, with al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri even secretly ordering the adoption, again, of a more moderate, friendly face for the organization and the cessation of foreign plotting. Nusra Front subsequently assumed a lead role in capturing much of northern Idlib province from Bashar al-Assad’s regime between March and June 2015, recementing its status as an invaluable ally to the revolution.

Nusra Front’s emirate takes shape

By mid-2015, Nusra Front had become a dominant military power in much of Idlib. Only the Syrian Salafi group Ahrar al-Sham wielded comparable power in the region. Despite having initially proclaimed its intention to share power and govern together with other civilian and military opposition bodies, Nusra Front soon launched unilateral attempts to rule over parts of Idlib city and the towns of Jisr al-Shughour and Ariha.

Despite local civilian resistance, Nusra Front has remained determined to establish its influence, steadily expanding the scope of its control. In particular, the establishment of the “Liberated Districts Administration” as a body in charge of a broad range of governance activities indicated the group’s intent to formalize its control over territory and population. By summer 2015, following Nusra Front’s withdrawal of forces from northern Aleppo, Idlib had quite clearly emerged as the center of al Qaeda’s Syrian project.

As Nusra Front attempted to consolidate its control in Idlib, bolstered by the newly arrived forces from northern Aleppo, perhaps the most influential living al Qaeda figure other than Zawahiri crossed into northern Syria. Having been released from an Iranian prison as part of a prisoner swap deal with al Qaeda’s Yemeni affiliate, former Egyptian special forces Col. Saif al-Adel was allegedly expressly ordered by Zawahiri to aid Nusra Front. “This is all part of al Qaeda’s plan,” a senior Salafi figure based in Idlib said. “Saif al-Adel is here to ensure that Zawahiri’s project in Syria is realized. Al-Sham has become everything to al Qaeda’s global strategy.”

Almost certainly traveling with Saif al-Adel were three other key al Qaeda figures, all of whose histories connected them to the movement’s highest levels of leadership. Of the three, two were Egyptian nationals — Abu al-Khayr al-Masri and Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah (also known as Abu Mohammed al-Masri). Both have been implicated in the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa; Abu al-Khayr also was a former aide of Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and happens to be married to one of Bin Laden’s daughters. The third individual was a Palestinian-Jordanian, Khaled al-Arouri, who is married to a daughter of Islamic State founder Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. If these three figures are still in northern Syria together with Saif al-Adel, then the significance of Al-Qaeda’s presence in Syria arguably now outweighs its presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

What’s clear is that shortly after Adel arrived in northern Syria, Nusra Front initiated discussion within its senior leadership regarding the group’s overall strategy and the feasibility of establishing an emirate in Idlib. The discussions were seen as so important that two of Nusra Front’s most senior figures in southern Syria were transferred to Idlib so that they could take part, according to sources speaking to this author. One, Sami al-Oraydi, was the chief sharia official in Nusra Front and thus the group’s de facto deputy leader. The other, Iyad al-Toubasi (known as Abu Julaybib), was one of Nusra Front’s seven founding members in October 2011 and had gained notoriety in the south for having led a covert assassination campaign against opposition figures who resisted Nusra Front’s influence.

Coming amid Russia’s intervention in Syria, Abu Julaybib’s arrival in northern Syria in late 2015 has been widely interpreted as a sign that Nusra Front is preparing for similar targeted attacks against any detractors of its emirate plans. “It’s a really scary move, to be honest,” a Latakia-based Islamist commander said. “Everyone knows what Abu Julaybib is capable of, and, given the circumstances, it can only point to one thing: more death.”

Influential Nusra Front clerics then began an informal consultation process with a small number of conservative sheikhs in Idlib, Latakia, and Aleppo to judge the appetite for the group’s plans. “They didn’t get the answers they were looking for,” the Idlib-based Salafist told me. “It was a big shock to them. They really didn’t expect it.”

Concerned by this early opposition, Nusra Front changed tack. In January, the group convened a meeting of leaders of armed groups in Idlib and proposed a grand military merger. In doing this, Nusra Front exploited its principal source of leverage over opposition groups: Although the vast majority of Syria’s opposition opposed an overt al Qaeda project on Syrian soil, the global jihadi movement’s Syrian affiliate remained an invaluable ally on the battlefield.

While some groups in the room indicated an interest in a merger, Ahrar al-Sham rejected the proposition altogether due to Nusra Front’s allegiance to al Qaeda. Two sources who requested anonymity claimed Nusra Front’s leader, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, had used that initial meeting as a sounding board for his emirate plans, by meeting on the side with two smaller jihadi factions — Jund al-Aqsa and the Turkistan Islamic Party — both of which expressed their support.

Challenged by a fragile calm

Already discouraged by the early negative responses, the cessation of hostilities that went into effect in large parts of Syria in late February posed a second challenge to Nusra Front. As its influence in Syria was directly linked to its capacity to demonstrate value on the battlefield, the decline in violence catalyzed a dramatic re-empowerment of Syria’s moderate protest movement and the revitalization of the most moderate elements of the opposition.

In parts of Idlib, some protests even began to adopt slogans hostile to Assad’s regime and al Qaeda. In the town of Maarat al-Numan, Nusra Front’s patience wore out on March 11, when its fighters violently dispersed demonstrators and attacked the bases of the 13th Division, a Free Syrian Army (FSA) group vetted by the CIA and supported through a multinational command center in Turkey. The expulsion of the 13th Division from Maarat al-Numan sparked days of protests in Idlib and further afield, some of which (here, here and here) included leading members of Ahrar al-Sham. For the first time in several years, al Qaeda’s strategy in Syria appeared to have failed the group.

Nusra Front quickly identified the cessation of hostilities as a threat to its influence and set about attempting to undermine it. Beginning around March 20, the al Qaeda affiliate convened a series of meetings with armed opposition groups active in northern Hama, Latakia, and southern Aleppo, with the intention of persuading them that their interests were better served in fighting than in supporting the political process in Geneva.

“They presented some convincing arguments,” an opposition commander who attended one of the meetings said. “But mostly, it seemed we were being threatened: If we didn’t join the operation, we would be seen as an enemy.”

Three weeks later, simultaneous offensives were launched in all three operational zones — all led by Nusra Front. Within hours, Nusra Front had regained its status as a necessary opposition ally in its bitter and brutal revolutionary struggle, while the moderate opposition reassumed secondary importance. Remarkably, even the units of the 13th Division — which Nusra Front had openly attacked in Maarat al-Numan just weeks earlier — joined the offensive in southern Aleppo.

While opposition groups had felt under increasing pressure to retaliate against continued regime violations of the cessation of hostilities, it’s unlikely that they would have been able to mount a significant offensive in northern Syria absent Nusra Front’s military power.

“Don’t you think we would prefer not to have al-Nusra in our trenches?” one FSA commander asked. “They represent everything we are opposed to. Sometimes, they are the same as the regime. But what can we do when our supposed friends abroad give us nothing to assert ourselves? We rely on others only because we cannot do the job by ourselves.”

Now that fighting has resumed, Nusra Front has allegedly intensified its consultation process surrounding its plans for an emirate in Idlib. On al Qaeda’s invitation, Rifai Ahmad Taha, a highly influential Egyptian jihadi figure, crossed into northern Syria on April 1 from Turkey. Taha was a jihadi of serious repute: He was a founding member of Egypt’s radical al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya, suspected of involvement in the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in east Africa, and was a signatory of Osama bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa against the United States and Israel.

Though invited as an “independent” mediator, Taha in his job, according to three Islamist sources in Idlib and Aleppo, was to encourage unity within al Qaeda’s three circles of leadership (one other source claimed Taha was also in Syria to engage with those who advocated Nusra Front’s breaking of ties with al Qaeda). The first circle of leadership with whom he would engage consisted of Nusra Front’s core leadership surrounding Jolani, which had begun advocating a return to a “long-game” approach. The second included hard-line factions of Nusra Front’s military and religious leaders, who were pushing for the establishment of an emirate. And the third comprised an emerging and separate al Qaeda Central grouping, which wanted an emirate established as soon as possible, to serve as a stepping stone for a resumption of external attack plotting.

Stopping Nusra Front’s emirate

Taha, however, would not serve as a mediator for long. He was killed in a U.S. drone strike only four days after arriving in Syria. Alongside him was Abu Omar al-Masri, the former right-hand man of Emir Khattab — a Saudi jihadi famous for his leadership in Chechnya — who had been active in Syria as early as 2012. Since Taha’s death, Nusra Front has continued to very slowly expand the breadth of its consultation process, seeking to win some level of acceptance for its emirate plans.

Internally, the al Qaeda affiliate remains split on how fast to establish the emirate. In the end, developments on the battlefield may play a role in determining the outcome of these debates.

While a renewed cease-fire would likely spoil al Qaeda’s plans, a steady escalation of hostilities could potentially provoke a level of desperation within opposition ranks that may provide space for some limited level of grudging acceptance of the emirate. A rejuvenated version of the “Army of Conquest,” a rebel coalition including Nusra Front, now looks set to emerge in Idlib and Aleppo, as a consequence of the discussions initiated by the al Qaeda affiliate in January. This development indicates that some Syrians have already begun to tighten their cooperative bonds with Nusra Front, albeit out of a perceived military — and not ideological — necessity.

Given the resumption of fighting in Syria, and the corresponding rise in Nusra Front’s fortunes, the group will almost certainly follow through on its plans and establish an emirate in Idlib by the end of 2016. It is now up to the United States and its allies to determine which portion of Syria’s mainstream opposition is confident enough to resist such a move. The first step is acknowledging that the vast majority of Syria’s mainstream opposition rejects, in principle, the presence of an al Qaeda emirate in their country and the imposition of transnational jihadi objectives onto Syrian soil.

However, the West has not yet demonstrated its determination to provide sufficient support to the opposition so that it can offer a viable alternative to Nusra Front’s influence as a potential government in northern Syria. In the city of Maarat al-Numan, the 13th Division rebel group has been linked to local civil society bodies and a moderate judicial system headed up by several moderate Sunni sheikhs. However, these institutions weren’t powerful enough to effectively confront Nusra Front. And rather than offer significant help to one of its most prominent and popular Syrian “assets,” the United States simply stood by and watched silently as the 13th Division was attacked in Maarat al-Numan, and ultimately defeated, by al Qaeda.

There is still an opportunity to rescue some of this lost opportunity. However, it will require a substantial expansion of military, political, and financial assistance to a broad spectrum of Syria’s opposition. There are currently more than 50 separate FSA groups that have been vetted by the CIA, all of which operate in coordination with locally legitimate civil, political, and judicial bodies. In dramatically expanding its support, the West should embrace an “ink spot” strategy that empowers these opposition strands in tandem. The aim should be to establish a gradually expanding network of empowered, internationally backed, and genuinely influential opposition communities, whose individual successes empower the others and provide a barrier to al Qaeda influence.

If Western policymakers continue on their current course, however, al Qaeda will continue to advance along its path toward an emirate. Only by empowering local groups opposed to its transnational jihadi agenda can we avoid gifting northwestern Syria to al Qaeda on a silver platter.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/04/al ... ern-syria/

[Anthea]

An excellent article with a great deal thought and a great deal of truth

We already know that, unlike ISIS, al Nusra works with other jihadist groups

We also know that al Nusra has steadily been gaining strength

For some reason, al Nusra is seldom mentioned in the media, even though they are one of the strongest jihadist groups in Syria especially around Aleppo

Just a thought: Why does nobody ever mention the Islamic Front, they have been much stronger and more active than ISIS around Aleppo

Also, the Islamic front are an extremely violent and barbaric group, who make ISIS look like choir boys

Given that there is a great deal of action in and around Aleppo we know nothing about, it is indeed more than likely al Nusra really are laying the groundwork for al Qaeda to move in

The Syrian people may welcome the unifying influence of al Qaeda, following ISIS barbarism and the coalition bombing of innocent civilians

[Anthea]

Al-Qaeda leader gives blessing for terror group to form own 'Islamic state' in Syria

Interesting audio tape is another salvo in the complex and long-running rivalry between Isil and al-Nusra, two jihadist groups who share some goals but differ violently on their methods.

Jabhat al-Nusra is one of the dominant powers in north-western Syria and has a toehold in Aleppo, the country’s largest city and the scene of fierce bombardment by Syrian government forces and their Russian allies.

Charles Lister, an analyst at the Middle East Institute who has interviewed leaders of Syria's Islamist groups, suggested that al-Nusra would become more repressive against civilians if it imposed an emirate.

“In all likelihood, incidents of capital punishment would dramatically increase, civilian freedoms would be restricted, and Nusra Front’s tolerance of nonreligious, nationalist, and civil opposition bodies would decline,” he wrote in Foreign Policy magazine.

The move could also put al-Nusra on a collision course with other rebel groups fighting against the Assad regime.

“So far al-Nusra has been able to work with other factions, including the Free Syrian Army (FSA), by prioritising the fight against Assad other its own long term objectives. The creation of an emirate would represent a significant shift in this strategy and will force other opposition groups to either back the "emirate" or fight it,” said Michael Horowitz, a senior analyst with the Levantine Group.

Jabhat al-Nusra has been at pains to present itself as a domestic Syrian group and a product of the 2011 uprising against the Assad regime, while pointing out that Isil’s leadership is dominated by Iraqis. The arrival of al-Adel and a raft of other al-Qaeda leaders, including a relative of bin Laden himself, suggests it is about to reassert its credentials as both a local rebel group and a source of international jihadist activity, like its counterpart in Yemen.

In his audio message, Zawahiri urged the people of Syria to resist efforts to end the five-year civil war through a UN-brokered political compromise and eventual elections for a new government.

He argued that in the cases of both Algeria and Egypt, Islamic parties had won power through elections only to lose it again to coups carried out by the secular armed forces.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05 ... -own-isla/

[Londoner]

It is a good idea provided they stop violence and terrorism outside their proposed Emarate.

[Anthea]

It is a good idea provided they stop violence and terrorism outside their proposed Emarate.

In light of yet more reports, it looks as though they are serious

Is the west prepared to except them as leaders of the more radical Islamic factions?

Makes me wonder because there has been very little media focus on the group

[Anthea]

After splitting with Al-Qaeda, Al-Nusra is being presented to the West as a moderate force. It’s nothing of the sort

The jihadist force's reputation is being cleaned up, to suggest it is deserving of CIA support

So ol‘ Doc Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden’s chief executive successor, has told the Syrian Jabhat al-Nusra that it can dissociate itself from Al-Qaeda. Good public relations: Nusra doesn’t like the Isis “caliphate” very much, but as long as it remains a Qaeda clone, it can’t get off America’s terrorist list and qualify to join the (non-existent) 70,000 Syrian “moderates” dreamed up by David Cameron and a lot of American television networks.

Qatar's relations with Nusra raises questions. It denies direct ties with the group, and yet six months ago the Qatari Al-Jazeera channel interviewed Nusra’s leader, Mohamed al-Jolani, who said that it had nothing against Christians, Alawites or Americans – only that pesky president in Damascus who’s got Hezbollah, Iran and Russia on his side.

Have no doubts about the Qatar link. Nusra boys have just released three Spanish journalists held in northern Syria for the past 10 months, after which the Qatari state news agency boasted that the Qatari authorities were involved in freeing them. You bet they were. Had the unlucky three fallen into the hands of those other morbid sons-of-the-desert, Isis (for whom many Saudis seem to have an unhappy affection), then the reporters would have had their throats cut on videotape against a soundtrack of yet more mushy "nasheed" music.

When a group of Christian nuns fell into Nusra hands in Syria in 2013, Qatar helped to bail them out via Lebanon – at a reported price of more than $1m a nun – and was duly thanked by the Lebanese security authorities. If readers are getting a little bit suspicious, perhaps wondering if the Qataris are trying to take over the armed Syrian opposition from Isis and its Saudi Salafist brothers, they may well be right.

But now the flip side of the story. Just a week ago, an essay appeared in Foreign Policy magazine, the bi-weekly co-founded by the late Samuel Huntington (of Clash of Civilisations infamy) and now owned by the Washington Post, no less. The author Charles Lister’s thesis, if such it can be called, is that al-Qaeda is trying to take total control of the Nusra and overshadow Isis through an unprecedented debate within its ranks to “integrate into the ‘mainstream opposition’”. The "mainstream opposition" presumably refers to the fictional 70,000-strong legions beloved of Dave Cameron and, presumably, the future US President Hillary Clinton.

Nusra, according to Lister, is “rebuilding a military coalition and plans to soon initiate major offensive operations south of Aleppo” in order to spoil US and Russian efforts for a truce in the city. The best way of thwarting Al-Qaeda’s ambitions “is to dramatically scale up assistance to vetted [sic] military and civil components [sic, again] of the mainstream opposition inside Syria,” he writes. All this, of course, because we’ve so far given “insufficient backing” to those “moderate elements of the opposition” who can’t compete with the “battlefield power and capacity to control territory” of Nusra.

So far, so good. Far from breaking free of al-Qaeda, Lister’s version of Nusra suggest that it’s been ever more deeply penetrated by al-Qaeda – or “Al-Qaeda Central”, as he calls it – to the point where Saif al-Adel, “the most influential living al-Qaeda figure other than Zawahiri”, has arrived in Syria. And Adel has done so “almost certainly”, as Lister adds reassuringly, with “three other key al-Qaeda figures”.

These guys are now supposedly discussing the setting up of yet another "emirate” in Syria’s Idlib province. But the recent cessation of hostilities “catalyzed a dramatic re-empowerment of Syria’s moderate protest movement and the revitalisation of the most [sic, yet again] moderate elements of the opposition”.

An anonymous Free Syrian Army (ie: ‘moderate’) commander is quoted by Lister as confirming that al-Qaeda forces “represent everything we are opposed to, they are the same as the regime. But what can we do when our supposed friends abroad give us nothing to assert ourselves?” What “a broad spectrum of Syria’s opposition” need, therefore, is “a substantial expansion of military, political and financial assistance”.

These Free Syrian Army groups, Lister says, now number 50 – phew! – vetted by the CIA, all of which “operate in coordination with locally legitimate [sic yet once more] civil, political and judicial bodies”.

So who is the writer Charles Lister? Among his various academic duties, he’s a senior consultant for the “Shaikh Group’s Track II Syria Initiative”. The “shaikh” in question is not a Middle East potentate but Salman Shaikh, director of the Brookings Doha Centre in Qatar and fellow at the Centre for Middle East Policy, formerly the Saban Centre for Middle East Policy (the “Saban” being Haim Saban, the American-Israeli film and television mogul who donated $13m to the centre and has given substantial funds to Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign).

Lister, according to his various CVs, was a visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Centre and has helped negotiate a process of “engagement with the leaderships of over 100 Syrian armed opposition groups”. Which is an awful lot of rebels – far more than the 70,000 conjured up by Dave Cameron.

So what’s going on down in Doha? The Brookings Doha Centre belongs to the Brookings Institute and its co-chair is Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber bin Thani al-Thani, a member of the Qatari ruling family and former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. Is the real debate, therefore – far from being thrashed out in Idlib province – really going on down in Qatar, whose present leadership has gone a long way to clean up Nusra’s reputation and to present it as the real moderate “opposition” which deserves all that CIA help?

A final point. Isis has been bloody quiet recently, in every sense of the word. No gory videos, no nasheed songs. Why? Because it’s losing ground to the Syrians and their allies? Because it lost Palmyra?

Or because it’s waiting to find out whether Nusra is going to be the darling of the Syrian opposition – and thus America and Europe – or targeted by all of us as an even more apocalyptic version of Isis?

http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/aft ... 22271.html